

When does the personal vote matter for party loyalty? The conditional effects of candidate-centered electoral systems. *

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Abstract

When do candidate-centered electoral systems produce undisciplined parties? In this paper we examine party discipline under open list proportional representation, a system associated with MPs cultivating personal constituencies. We present a model explaining how legislators' preferences and support among voters mediate political leaders' ability to enforce discipline. We show that disloyalty in candidate-centered systems depends on parties' costs for enforcing discipline, *but only conditional* on MP preferences. MPs who share policy preferences of their leaders will be loyal even when the leaders could not afford to discipline them. To test the model's implications, we use data on legislative voting in Poland's parliament. Our empirical findings confirm that disloyalty is conditioned on party leaders' enforcement capacity and MP preferences. We find that legislators who contribute more to the party electorally in terms of votes are more disloyal, but only if their preferences diverge from the leadership. Our results suggest that the theoretical relationship between open lists and party disloyalty should be treated as conditional and highly dependent on the context of the party system.

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Introduction

Scholars of comparative politics have long focused on the role of the electoral system in mediating how legislators respond to the competing pressures of party and constituency. While the US literature focused on the localizing incentives created by single member districts, comparative work has emphasized the role of incentives for intraparty competition.¹ As most democracies use some form of party lists,² the personal vote is mainly associated with the candidate-centered “open list” proportional representation (OLPR), where individual candidates receive votes and only vote shares (not list placement) determines whether candidates win seats.³ While candidates of the same party pool their votes on the same list, OLPR creates incentives for candidates to compete with co-partisans. Because of the importance of votes for individual candidates, open lists are believed to motivate legislators to cultivate a personal vote⁴—a reputation distinct from co-partisans. If legislative roll call voting can serve as a form of position-taking behavior that influences individual reputations, incentives can arise for MPs to vote in accordance with constituent demands, even against their party’s collective position.

Because voters determine the priority with which candidates on a list are awarded seats in the legislature, scholars have often suggested that the presence of such individualizing incentives in the electoral context translates into difficulty with enforcing party discipline. Yet, especially in parliamentary regimes, the pressure to vote with party leaders is persistently high.⁵ Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, evidence for a relationship between open-list PR and lower party unity has been mixed.⁶ Sieberer⁷ finds, for example, that open list systems in Finland and Denmark represent, respectively, the lowest and highest party unity observed in a sample of Western Europe.

While there is ample evidence that open-lists are important to the nature of politics in general,⁸ the circumstances under which this mechanism matters for *party unity* are less clear. Here we suggest that while OLPR indeed should make party discipline more difficult to achieve, disloyal behavior will be systematically observed only under specific conditions. In

particular we argue that when an MP's personal vote is a significant contributor to the party's electoral success the party leadership is inclined to tolerate disloyalty. However whether or not an MP will try to take advantage of his personal vote in this way is itself conditional on the extent to which the MP has policy disagreements with the party leadership. In other words, open lists can reduce party unity, but the personal vote only matters for voting unity when there is preference divergence between the MP and the leader.

To clarify the precise circumstances under which OLPR produces disloyalty among MPs we formalize this dynamic with a model that accounts simultaneously for party resources/organization, ideological cohesion, and the electoral independence of MPs. We describe in particular 1.) how individual loyalty responds in equilibrium to changes in the leader's power to enforce discipline and 2.) how the discipline each member requires for loyalty depends on both her electoral clout and the extent to which her preferences diverge from those of the leadership. Because the interactions among these factors are complex, we formally specify our assumptions and derive expectations about the conditional effects of preferences and electoral clout on loyalty, while also accounting for varying levels of party resources. By making the predictions precise, we shed light on how and when party leaders can counteract the pressures from voters on the party's rank and file membership. By separating the effects of institutional incentives from those related to party discipline, the model helps explain the wide variation in party unity observed among candidate-centered electoral systems.

We test the implications from our model using recorded voting data from Poland, a parliament elected via an open list system, where all roll call votes are recorded, and where patterns of bill sponsorship allow us insight into MPs preferences. First, we find that party loyalty corresponds to the MP-level variation in the leverage the individual MP derives from a personal vote, which, we argue, determines the leadership's ability to enforce discipline. Further, we find that the effect of MP vote shares on disloyalty is strongest for MPs that appear to diverge the most from the preferences of their party leaders, which we measure using patterns of bill co-sponsorship outside of their party. We interpret our findings to sug-

gest that while open-list PR indeed creates significant counter pressures for party unity, we will not observe disloyalty under most circumstances. Disloyalty among MPs with sufficient clout will be observed only when their preferences diverge sufficiently from the leadership. However, even when MPs are loyal to their party, the presence of OLPR always “matters” in the sense that its personal vote features always play a consequential role in *how* discipline is achieved.

Open lists such as those in Poland are used throughout the world in regimes as diverse as Brazil, Latvia, Finland, Denmark, and (formerly) Italy. Additionally, a number of other countries blend elements of OLPR into their electoral systems. These “flexible list systems” can be found in many countries, including the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Iceland, Bulgaria (before 2007), Slovakia, Indonesia, Slovenia, and Peru.⁹ In flexible list systems the position of the candidate on the list determines the priority of entering the legislature only if the vote share of the candidate falls below some established threshold, which can vary from 20 % (Czech Republic) to 50 % of the personal vote quota (The Netherlands). The same dynamics for disloyalty that are present in OLPR systems may also emerge in flexible list systems, but the ability to be disloyal would of course be conditioned on members’ ability to clear the threshold. By focusing on an OLPR system we are able to discuss the general tendencies arising from preference votes within lists in the most straightforward case. Poland is an ideal empirical case for testing our data not only because of its complete record of roll call data, but also because of its cosponsorship rules and data availability, which provide us with a measure of preferences which is independent of the roll call record. The rules for submitting a private bill require that at least 15 MPs must sponsor a bill, but there is no upper limit as to how many co-sponsors a bill has. Moreover, private bills dominate the legislative process, as even cabinet bills end up being submitted as private bills to avoid procedural delays. In the period under study, between 40 and 50 % of all bills passed originated as private bills.¹⁰ Furthermore, in the period we study, party leaders had not yet introduced restrictions on cosponsorship behavior for their MPs, which

allowed many Polish MPs to use cosponsorship to cooperate with other parties on matters of common interest or as a position-taking opportunity.

Open lists and party discipline

Among proportional representation systems, the electoral system where personal vote incentives due to intra-party competition are strongest is open list proportional representation. In OLPR, voters cast a vote for the specific candidate within a party they prefer. The votes for candidates within each party list are used to determine the priority with which candidates will obtain seats in the assembly.¹¹ This is in stark contrast to closed list proportional systems (CLPR), where voters are limited to a party vote. A ranking of candidates by party leaders determines the priority with which candidates take the legislative seats won by the party. This power contributes greatly to party leaders' capacity to enforce party discipline.¹²

The notion that OLPR creates incentives for candidates to compete with co-partisans is suggested by an array of research (e.g. Golden and Chang; Ames; Cheibub and Sin; and Traber, Hug, and Sciarini¹³). The competition for votes determining the priority of entering the legislature creates apparent incentives for some MPs to vote in accordance with constituent demands, even against their party's collective position. This potential for voters' policy preferences coming into conflict with those of party leaders should make enforcing party discipline a challenge under OLPR. At the same time, in parliamentary regimes, the pressure to vote with party leaders is persistently high. Hence disunity is not consistently observed in open list systems.¹⁴

How, then, is this tension within the party resolved? In order to observe disloyal behavior not only must the party fail to discipline a member, but also a legislator's preferences must diverge from the policy supported by the leadership.¹⁵ In an OLPR context, this would arise when MP preferences (possibly due to pressures from constituents) differ from the preferences of the party leadership and the leadership failed to execute discipline. Lacking

any divergence in preferences, we would not observe disloyalty to the party, even without party pressures. Furthermore, because voting unity is so important in parliamentary regimes, parties will devote resources to counteracting the pressures constituents put on their party members to vote against the party. To enforce discipline parties may reward members,¹⁶ or sanction them by, for instance, suspending membership or threatening nominations.¹⁷

A party nomination is a valuable commodity for leaders to reward loyal MPs and counteract any incentive to be disloyal.¹⁸ However, whether the threat of losing a nomination is credible depends on how much leverage the individual member enjoys due to their clout within the party. A popular member running on a party list in OLPR not only secures a seat for herself in the legislature, but also contributes her electoral support to the party as a whole, helping elect less popular members. Hence, punishing popular members by denying their place on the list would likely be counter-productive for the party's political goals. In OLPR systems a candidate's share of votes secured in the district can serve as an objective measure of that candidate's electoral value to a party, leading to a clearly visible disparity among MPs. This disparity then translates into the ease with which MPs may be disciplined into voting with their party. Two MPs with preferences equally divergent from the party leadership may be able to vote differently because one has the potential to contribute so many votes to the party that the leader cannot *afford* to discipline the MP. An MP elected under open lists in the Polish Sejm who typically "wins an overwhelming majority of votes from [his] district" and thus has "never felt conflicted between party interests and voter interests" therefore "always follows his voters" (Mojzeszowicz, interview 2010). That is, the leverage his popularity afforded him *vis a vis* the party leadership left him relatively free of party discipline. Compared to other electoral systems, OLPR formalizes and clarifies the means of obtaining this 'clout'.

In sum, what we observe as party unity, results from a series of decisions by individual MPs regarding whether or not to vote with the party leadership. Loyalty is first mediated by the policy preferences of members. Second, it is mediated by the resources (sanctions and

rewards) available to party leaders as they pressure members to vote with the party if doing so is against the member's preferences. Third, it is mediated by members' individualized ability to influence how effectively sanctions induce voting loyalty.

To capture and organize this multi-layered structure of factors that affect MP's loyalty and their mutual interactions, the following section presents a simple formal model. The model allows us to formulate predictions about the conditional effects of preferences on MP clout. From our model, we find that party loyalty corresponds to the MP-level variation in the leverage that the individual MP derives from a personal vote, which, we argue, determines the leadership's ability to enforce discipline. Further, we find that the effect of MP vote shares on disloyalty is strongest for MPs that appear to diverge from the preferences of their party leaders, measured as their tendency to engage in bill co-sponsorship outside of their party. With regard to party resources available to reward members, although higher resources make enforcing discipline easier, there is no moderating effect on the leverage derived from the personal vote. In other words, resources used for rewarding discipline have the same effect on MPs with a lot of voter support as they do on MPs with low voter support. The subsequent sections provide empirical tests of these propositions.

The Model

The model presented in this section captures the interaction between a party leader and a party member. Both are characterized by their preferences, but additionally, we incorporate information about the party member's clout, corresponding to the vote share he is capable of securing in his district.

This notion of electoral clout—the electoral popularity of a member—may derive from any combination of attributes and accomplishments of the candidate.¹⁹ Although voters are not formally players in the game, they could be easily incorporated if we were to assume that their preferences coincide with those of the MP. If that were the case, the distance

between the ideal point of the leader and the member could be taken to represent the dual accountability problem facing MPs in OLPR systems.²⁰ Informally, we could say that the MPs are agents of two principals—the strategic leaders and the non-strategic voters. For our purposes, however, the MPs disagreements with leaders’ preferences may be due to any combination of their individual views, pressure from constituents, interest groups or personal networks. Hence, to be as general as possible in the model below, we abstract from the possible reasons that the MPs preferences diverge from those of the leadership and subscript the leader’s ideal point “MP.”

We define $N = \{L, MP\}$ as the set of players.

The game starts with a move of L , who applies discipline to one of two policies 0 and x from a one-dimensional policy space. In the case of a governing party, one may think of x as a policy that has been proposed by the cabinet and 0 as the status quo. In the next stage, the MP chooses whether to follow discipline, interpreted in the game, as voting with the Leader. If the MP complies, the game ends. In the event of noncompliance, in the following stage, the Leader decides whether to enforce discipline. Following the Leader’s decision about enforcing discipline, the game ends. In short, being loyal is synonymous in our model with following discipline, that is with the MP’s choosing the same policy as the Leader; being disloyal is synonymous with violating discipline, that is, with choosing the opposite policy as the leader; and enforcing discipline is synonymous with the Leader choosing the action “discipline” in the last stage of the game.

Formally, the Leader’s strategy space is $S_L = \{A_L^1 \times A_L^2\}$ where $A_L^1 = \{0, x\}$, $A_L^2 = \{f : A_L^1 \times A_{MP} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}$, where 1 represents the decision to enforce discipline and 0 represents the decision to refrain from enforcing discipline. The MP’s strategy space is $S_{MP} = \{f : A_L^1 \rightarrow \{0, x\}\}$. The Leader’s and MP’s ideal points are represented by b_L and b_{MP} , respectively, on a one-dimensional policy space.

The utility of the Leader is shaped by his policy preferences and the cost of enforcing discipline, the last of which depends on the MP’s stature or clout, represented by $\pi \in [-1, 1]$.

Hence: $U_L(s_L, s_{MP}) = -(b_L - a_{MP}^1)^2 - \pi V(d)$. MPs with π close to 1 are more likely to be guaranteed a seat in the legislature irrespective of how well their party does in the election as a whole. MPs with π close to -1 depend heavily on the popularity of others in their party for retaining their parliamentary seats. The high π MPs are those colloquially referred to in Poland as the “steam engines,” because they attract many voters to a party and enable the election of weaker (low π) candidates. In the subsequent discussion we refer to MPs with $\pi > 0$ as “high clout” and to MPs with $\pi < 0$ as “low clout”. To be clear, there is a continuum between low and high clout types. Because high clout MPs supply a considerable part of the party’s vote share from a given list, they are considerably more independent in the legislature than MPs, who owe their seats to the party.

$V(d)$ represents the effects of imposing discipline that are internalized by the party leadership. In the case of a high clout type, this effect is transformed into a cost by the coefficient π , but in the case of a low clout MP, it is transformed into a net benefit. The ease with which leaders can enforce discipline depends not only on the MP’s clout but also on some party level characteristics. The parameter d captures the party’s organizational capability, what Mainwaring and Scully refer to as “the routinization of intra-party procedures”.²¹ Formally, we make the following assumptions about this parameter:

$$d > 0$$

and

$$V(d) = \begin{cases} d & \text{if } a_L^2 = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The utility of the MP, on the other hand, reflects his concern for the voters, avoiding punishment for breaking discipline, weighted by his vote share, and the party resources he receives for supporting the leadership. Hence: $U_{MP}(s_L, s_{MP}) = -(b_{MP} - a_{MP}^1)^2 + v(r) + V(d)\pi$ where $v(r)$, is a function transforming the resources the leadership can offer the MP if he supports the leadership’s decisions:

$$r > 0$$

and

$$v(r) = \begin{cases} r & \text{if } a_L^1 = a_{MP}^1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

High levels of r characterize members of parties that expect to have access to the distribution of spoils of office. Lower levels of r characterize members of parties that lack access to power. As a result, these members have less to lose from disagreeing with the leadership on policy choice whether this entails breaking party discipline or not.

As explained above, in our general model, the voters are not a strategic player, but their policy preferences could be substituted into the MP’s utility function as a factor influencing his voting incentives. For instance, our modeling choices are consistent with modeling counter pressures from the party leadership—who can impose discipline—and from constituents—to whom MPs must appeal to obtain personal votes—underscores the “competing principals” or dual accountability dilemma facing MPs.²² Although conceptually distinct from the voters’ ideal point, the ideal point of the MP could be interpreted as constituency pressure to deviate from the party leadership’s position. By the same token, we can interpret b_{MP} as shaped by any other parameter that enters the MP’s decision making process as long as it is separate from party influence, be it the ideal point of a funding lobby or extra-party network of the MP.

The game above is one of complete information and it is solved for Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in the appendix, which contains a formal description of the model, followed by a derivation of strategies in equilibrium.

Our model differs from formal models of accountability derived from American Politics (e.g. Fox and Shotts²³) in important respects. Instead of focusing on incumbents’ accountability to voters, we are interested in observing how legislators respond to the opposing pressures from voters and leaders.

Our approach has most in common with the most influential work on this topic by Kam,²⁴ which focuses on party discipline in Westminster systems. While both Kam’s model and ours intend to uncover the circumstances where MPs are most likely to dissent, there are several important differences. For instance, in Westminster systems party leaders are positioned to propose policies. We, however, envision a multiparty context where leaders would not always have this power, due to deliberations with coalition partners or parliamentary influence.

Interpretation

To make empirical predictions, it is useful to present the results as equilibrium outcomes. Figure 1 does so as a function of the MP’s ideal point, b_{MP} relative to the two exogenously given policies 0 and x , captured by the location of $\frac{x}{2}$, and MP vote share, π . To interpret the results in a more approachable way, we refer to the representation of parameter values for high clout MPs in Figure 1 as “Regions” and to the representation of parameter values for low clout MPs as “Areas.”

—*Figure 1 about here*—

Recall our assumption that the leader’s ideal point is to the right of the MP’s. That is, $b_{MP} < b_L$. This assumption has no ideological interpretation and introduces no loss of generality. Fixing $b_{MP} < b_L$ simply implies that indifferent or undecided MPs will always support the same policies as the leader and thus their preferences can be interpreted as convergent with those of the leader.

What counts as indifference sufficient to share the leader’s preferences is falling within $\frac{x}{2x}$ of $\frac{x}{2}$, the midpoint between 0 and x . In the case of the most indifferent (or undecided) MPs there is no difference between the behavior of high clout and low clout MPs. The model makes exactly the same predictions for parameters falling in Region B as for parameters in Area 3.

Note that indifference between the considered policies, as interpreted here, does not mean that the MP’s ideal point is exactly $\frac{x}{2}$, but that it falls within a distance from that point.

How wide that distance is depends on the parameter r representing the resources parties have at their disposal to reward loyalty. Members of parties with sizable resources will support leadership more readily than members of parties with fewer resources.

Outside of the indifference region, our results immediately indicate that low clout MPs will not vote with the leadership under the same circumstances as high clout MPs.

If the high clout MP has preferences that are beyond Region B, as for instance in Region A, he will do whatever his constituents prefer: he will support 0 if their ideal point is in Region A (that is, to the left of $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r}{2x}$) and he will support x if his constituents' ideal point is to the right of $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r}{2x}$. In equilibrium, the high clout MP is never disciplined.

In Area 3, the low clout MP does not require discipline to vote along with the leadership. Extending away from Area 3 is a shaded triangular region (Area 2) where the leadership has a credible threat of imposing discipline. This credible threat induces the MP to back the leadership's choice, because lack of subordination would result in disciplining sanctions. The region of credible threat to discipline increases as the MP's vote share declines, suggesting that MPs with the lowest clout are most vulnerable to discipline. Area 2's base is widest for the most negative values of π . Note, that an increase in d , the parameter representing party organization and capacity for disciplining action (i.e., the "routinization of intra-party procedures"²⁵), is also associated with the wider base of Area 2, where discipline is administered to keep the low clout MP in line. This implies, all else equal, that better organized parties find it easier to maintain unity when their membership lacks cohesion, interpreted here as preferences in close alignment with the leadership. Of course, this comparative static holds only for the low clout case. Even a very well organized party cannot constrain high clout MPs with divergent preferences. Finally, in the case of constituency preferences corresponding to Area 1, low clout MPs will act in accordance with their own policy preferences. They will be disciplined, but given the extreme preferences of this electorate, they prefer to accept sanctions rather than punishment from voters.

The main empirical implication for MP loyalty is that, for policy preferences and MP

vote share corresponding to Area 2, the shaded triangle in Figure 1, low clout MPs will be more loyal than high clout with the same preferences. Consequently, parties with more high than low clout MPs will be less unified than parties with more low relative to high clout MPs. The conditional effect of vote share on preferences implies that even MPs with extreme policy preferences can be subjected to pressure from the leadership if their clout is sufficiently low. The second empirical implication is that resource-rich and better-organized parties enlarge the area in which MPs and leaders act in concert, whereas parties that are poorly organized have very narrow areas of MP support for leadership. Resources correspond to the value of party membership to a member. For instance, parties controlling the cabinet would be higher in resources than parties that are relegated to the opposition.²⁶ In contrast, party organization represents the extent to which disciplining members is a matter of party routines within the parliament.

Note, that although an increase in resources, r , increases the area where MPs vote together with the leadership, it affects high and low clout MPs in the same way; that is, there is no conditional effect of vote share associated with resources. This is not so, however, with d , the parameter that operationalizes a party's organizational capabilities. Better organized parties can exert more pressure on MPs with low vote share than on MPs with high vote share by making them toe the line where their preferences would urge them to do otherwise.²⁷

Empirical Implications

A clear implication of the model above is that observed disloyalty will be in large part a function of the costs of enforcing discipline. Recall from above that those MPs who are major contributors of votes to the party—the “high clout” types—are the most costly MPs on which to enforce discipline, since their sizeable contribution to the party makes the most severe punishment (denying nomination to the list) impractical for party leaders. In the case of one popular MP in Poland, for instance, “his name recognition...was so effective that not

only did the six candidates who were expected to win seats in the Torun district enter the Sejm, but also a seventh person managed to secure a seat” (Ardanowski, interview 2010). As the model demonstrates, the leader’s ability to enforce discipline on members with such clout is weak compared to others with less personal following. Imposing discipline upon major vote-getters is more costly than on others. In the Polish case a former Vice Speaker notes that “the President asked fifteen MPs to vote in a way that would violate party discipline.” Whereas, normally, “disobedience would result in having one’s name removed from the list, among the fifteen, there were about seven who were so-called ‘steam engines’ and removing them would result in losing considerable votes” (Wenderlich, interview 2011). By contrast, an MP without this electoral clout will have much less ability to vote against the party. One such MP in Poland notes that, “in a vote to appoint constitutional court justices, the party urged its members to vote against my law school advisor. I asked the caucus whip for an exemption. It was denied even though it would not have changed the final outcome” (Karpinski 2009).

The empirical implication is that members on whom enforcing discipline is more costly should exhibit less loyalty. This can be captured by a continuous concept—an MP’s vote share. Therefore, observed party loyalty should be lower for MP’s with the largest vote shares, on average. However, whether enforcement (or lack thereof) will play a decisive role in loyalty depends on the preferences of the MPs to oppose party policy positions. Members who most closely share the preferences of leaders should tend to be loyal even when enforcement capacity is relatively low. Meanwhile, members who prefer to pursue policies that satisfy constituencies diverging from their party should be disloyal insofar as party discipline cannot be easily enforced. We therefore expect that the effect of enforcement power on MP loyalty should be stronger for MPs whose underlying policy preferences appear to be most different from those of their party leadership. That is, *the degree to which MPs will become more disloyal as a result of higher vote shares is conditional on whether their preferences diverge from that of the party leadership.*

Empirical Analysis

For our empirical analysis, we use data from the Polish Sejm, a parliament elected under open list PR that provides us with a substantial amount of available electoral and legislative data suitable to answer the questions raised above. Poland’s open list electoral system clearly demonstrates what MPs describe as competition “essentially going on between people on the same list. Instead of cooperation in competing against opponents from different lists, they fight each other, competing for media attention, name recognition and even volunteers” (Karpinski interview 2010). The Polish case has also been associated with relatively weak party organizations and loyalty,²⁸ and thus provides useful variation for our study.²⁹

We use the cross-sectional variation in party loyalty scores to examine the implications described above. Subsequently, we examine party-level unity scores across votes over time, focusing on the electoral context facing the party as a whole. We use roll call data from 1997-2005, which covers all votes from the 3rd and 4th terms of the Polish Sejm.³⁰ During these terms, all roll call votes were recorded and all votes are used in the calculation of these measures.³¹

We measure the degree of party loyalty using for each MP the measure of “absolute” party loyalty proposed by Mainwaring and Perez-Linan,³² which counts abstentions as votes against the party. This score, which ranges from 0 to 100, simply represents the percentage of votes on which an MP voted for or against with the party’s overall position, including cases of abstention as disloyal.³³ The party’s position is based on the voting direction of a majority of the party.³⁴

As described above, party leaders’ enforcement depends on their ability to impose costs for disloyalty on an individual MP. In general, the leadership makes use of the nomination sanction mechanism described above.³⁵ But, due to differences in contributions to the party, reflecting popularity with voters, some members are less dependent on the party than others. In Poland’s open list context, this role is clearly recognized, as one MP notes: “the conventional wisdom is that this person is the ‘steam engine’ who attracts so many votes

that he will not only secure a seat for himself in the legislature, but will also bring along a number of other MPs...” Since clout is a continuous concept tied to contributions, we operationalize this leverage as the vote shares members contribute to the party list. Those with the greatest vote shares, according to the argument above, should be most successful at evading party discipline and thus we would expect to find them to be less loyal on average. The quantity we employ to capture this variation is the vote share—the percentage of votes a given MP received in his or her district.

—*Table 1 about here*—

In Table 1, we show the results of a OLS regression of loyalty scores on vote share (*Vote Share*), membership in a party in the governing coalition (*Govt Party*), and the size of the party, with fixed effects for the term and party-level random intercepts.

First we examine a basic model that establishes a baseline relationship with our measure of electoral clout. Here, we find that members responsible for larger vote share are indeed somewhat less loyal on average, consistent with the notion that discipline is less likely to be imposed as MPs attain high clout status. Also, we find that the larger parties are are, on average, more loyal, regardless of government status.

In a second model, we introduce an operationalization of MP preferences. Recall from above that although MPs with high vote shares should be less subject to discipline on average, this should be true primarily for MPs whose preferences diverge from the leader’s. Specifically, only under circumstances where there is some disagreement between MPs and party leaders should we expect a strong relationship between vote share and loyalty. In a second model we examine a closer approximation to the prediction made above: when enforcement is at its weakest, that is for high clout MPs, those with preferences further from the party leaders will be less loyal. While measures of preferences that are disconnected from voting behavior are not easily obtained for Polish MPs, we take advantage of another data source with political content—the cosponsorship of legislation. We use the bill cosponsorship decisions of members to assess whether an MP appears to have preferences that diverge

from that of their leaders, or perhaps wants to signal these differences to voters.³⁶ To capture this, we construct a measure of the tendency for members to cooperate on legislation sponsored by other parties. In the Polish Sejm, all legislation initiated as a private bill must be cosponsored by at least 15 MPs and these bills constitute a sizable proportion of those submitted (40% in the 3rd [1997-2001] term and 25% in the 4th [2001-2005]). They also constitute 40 (in the 3rd term) and 50% (in the fourth term) of bills that were actually passed. Thus, almost all members over the course of these terms cosponsored a bill and consequently can have an outside-party cosponsorship score assigned. During this time, party rules restricting cosponsorship had not yet been implemented, leaving us with an informative behavior reflecting individual MP decisions.³⁷ We consider MPs to have indicated divergent preferences from their party leaders when they co-sponsor proposals for which a majority of co-sponsors come from a different party. The reasoning behind this measure is that frequent sponsorship of legislation with MPs from other parties suggests an effort to pursue policies counter to those of one's own party leadership—or at least to cultivate a reputation for doing so.³⁸ Naturally, this proxy cannot be said to account for all aspects of members' disagreements with their parties. Here we only assume that members most frequently cosponsoring outside their party are more likely, on average, to have disagreements. In this second model, we include a term interacting vote share with *Outside-Party Cosponsorship*, which is a log transformation of the proportion of legislation an MP cosponsors for which most sponsors are from outside the MP's party. Naturally, this measure cannot capture all aspects of preference divergence with an MP's party, but identifies MPs that appear to be more likely hold such views.

These results suggest that across our sample, MPs with greater outside-party cosponsorship of legislation have a much stronger relationship between their vote share and their observed disloyalty. In other words, members with significant electoral clout from their personal vote tend to vote more disloyally only when ideologically distinct from their party.

—Figure 2 about here—

To better understand these effects substantively, Figure 2 plots the effect of vote share across the range of outside-party cosponsorship using results from the interaction model. The graph shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between vote share and loyalty for an MP with no outside-party cosponsorship. This type of MP may have the clout to avoid discipline, but likely faces few situations where voting against the party is desirable even in the absence of discipline. However, for an MP with apparently divergent preferences (high outside-party cosponsorship activity), the effect is substantively much stronger. We interpret this as consistent with our expectation above that party discipline is dependent on parties' ability to enforce it and is conditional on MPs having preferences ideologically divergent from the party leadership.

Conclusion and Discussion

Scholars have long investigated how parties reconcile the personal vote incentives of their members with their own goals of legislative unity.³⁹ In parliamentary regimes, this conflict has the potential to be acute, because of the premium placed on party unity. The proportional representation system OLPR produces a clear metric of popularity for each party member — her vote share—or the proportion of votes the member secures in her district. This metric is useful from the perspective of making predictions, because conventional wisdom leads us to expect that legislators who win particularly large vote shares should be harder to discipline. Since they cannot be credibly punished without harming party performance, they should be subject to discipline less often, which would lead to their greater disloyalty on average compared to those MPs who secure fewer votes (who can thus be more easily subject to discipline).

However, following Krehbiel,⁴⁰ we note that in order to be disloyal, a legislator's preferences must also diverge from those of the party, which is not always the case. When a legislator's preferences coincide with the policy supported by the leadership, enforcing party

discipline will have little bearing on the observed voting behavior. Finally, when preferences do diverge, parties can respond to counter the pressures facing legislators. Depending on their organizational capacity party leaders will resort to disciplining measures with more or less difficulty. Finally, when the party can afford it, the leadership may also offer legislators resources to keep their support.

Our model of discipline under open lists allows us to make clear predictions about the exact circumstances where disloyalty will be observed. In particular, we find that although disloyalty is indeed proportional to vote share, it is only so conditional on preferences diverging from the party. In other words, being an MP with electoral clout is necessary but not sufficient to observe disloyalty. Second, we evaluate what party leaders can do to obtain MPs' support for party positions, despite personal-vote-seeking incentives. When parties use rewards to convince members to vote along with them, these resources have the same effect on low and high clout members. Finally, our model underscores the importance of party organizations' institutionalization. To the extent that there has been a routinization of party procedures, parties have an easier time enforcing discipline.

We test this model in a setting with especially suitable electoral and party characteristics. Poland uses OLPR to elect its Sejm, which provides data with particular advantages. First, as we have noted, all votes are recorded, allowing us to obtain an unbiased measure of party loyalty. Second, during the time under study, cross-party cosponsorship allows us an intuitive measure of preference divergence, separate from voting behavior. In addition, Poland's parties, at an intermediate stage of institutionalization, had not yet clearly sorted into cohesive ideological parties, creating variation helpful for identifying the conditional effects in our analysis. In contrast, established advanced democracies offer less opportunity to observe parties in party list systems lacking strong preference cohesion.

Overall, we find that MPs who win more votes in their districts are less loyal to their parties and members who appear to have the most divergent underlying preferences from their party—as evidenced by their sponsorship of legislation with members of other parties—

are most disloyal when their vote share positions them to best avoid enforcement of discipline.

Because we test our model in the empirical setting of the Polish Sejm, our research also sheds light on the institutionalization of emerging party systems. In such systems, the personal vote incentives of candidates are reinforced by the incentive of party organizations to win more seats by recruiting independently popular individuals who can attract votes to their party. Recruiting such candidates serves the short term purpose of winning more legislative seats but comes at the cost of losing ideological cohesion, which in turn makes intraparty agreement and organization more difficult in the long term. In particular, parties in newer democracies, with volatile electorates, fluid party systems, and less institutionalized parties are often associated with such weaker.⁴¹

While party discipline has been stronger in Poland than a deterministic interpretation of OLPR's effect on party discipline might suggest, our findings are consistent with an important mediating role of institutions posited by the personal vote literature. While MPs are often concerned with their personal reputations, the factors we highlight can explain why party disunity has often not occurred. We conclude that a large range of variation in voting unity depends on the nature of party organizations and their enforcement capacity. In most situations, parties can counteract the personal vote effect of OLPR if they are organizationally capable of enforcing discipline. We interpret our findings to suggest that while open-list PR can indeed create significant counter pressures for party unity, these would likely manifest themselves as party disunity more commonly in less-institutionalized party systems. We also note that even when MPs are loyal to their party, OLPR still matters in the sense that the personal vote always plays an important role in *how* discipline is achieved.

Our formal and empirical analysis provides insight into the wide variation in voting unity in the context of personal vote incentives. Although open-list PR provides voters with an opportunity to hold their representatives individually accountable, this opportunity is not in itself sufficient to produce MPs with behavior that diverges from their party leaders. Instead, institutionalized parties can typically counteract the influence of voters. A party seeking to

maximize legislative seat share will attract to its lists independently popular candidates, potentially sacrificing ideological coherency. While a large party can be effective in winning parliamentary seats, its emphasis on size over coherence weakens its ability to maintain unity in the parliament and makes enforcing discipline more costly. Indeed, we suggest that conflicting incentives of open-list MPs are observed in the context of voting when a party's leadership lacks organizational capability to effectively enforce discipline on members.

In summary, the personal vote incentives of OLPR are persistently important for legislative voting because the nature of discipline is shaped by the leverage provided to MPs under the electoral system, as well as by the incentives parties have faced to recruit a diverse membership. We believe these results contribute to explaining the wide variation in the apparent unity of parties in candidate-centered electoral systems.


Table 1: Party Loyalty Across MPs

	(1)	(2)
	All	All
Vote Share	-3.306*	3.028
	(1.734)	(2.988)
Outside Cosponsorship		0.456***
		(0.096)
Vote Share X Outside Cosponsorship		-3.050***
		(1.154)
Govt Party	-0.343	-0.444
	(0.875)	(0.865)
Party Size	0.023***	0.026***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
4th Term	1.385*	1.608**
	(0.818)	(0.810)
Constant	93.244***	91.789***
	(0.919)	(0.958)
Observations	848	848
Number of pid	11	11

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1: Comparative Statics: Low Clout MPs and High Clout MPs






Figure 2: Effect of Vote Share on Party Loyalty, Conditioned on Outside-Party Sponsorship Behavior

Appendix

Recall that the game presented in section 2, Enforcing Discipline, $\langle N, S, U \rangle$, is defined by $N = \{L, MP\}$ $S_L = \{A_L^1 \times A_L^2\}$, where $A_L^1 = \{0, x\}$, $A_L^2 = \{f : A_L^1 \times A_{MP} \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\}\}$, and $S_{MP} = \{f : A_L^1 \rightarrow \{0, x\}\}$ and $U_L(S_L, S_{MP}) = -(b_L - a_{MP}^1)^2 - \pi V(d)$
 $U_{MP}(S_L, S_{MP}) = -(b_{MP} - a_{MP}^1)^2 + v(r) - V(d)\pi$.

We made the following assumptions about the parameters of the model

$$V(d) = \begin{cases} d & \text{if } a_L^2 = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$d > 0$$

$$v(r) = \begin{cases} r & \text{if } a_L^1 = a_{MP}^1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$r > 0, \pi \in [-1, 1]$$

The first proposition states the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria for the “low clout” type of MP ($\pi < 0$) and the second proposition states the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria for the “high clout” type of MP ($\pi > 0$).

Proposition .1 *If the Leader is dealing with a low clout MP, the following strategy profiles form a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium:*

1. $(x, 1, 0; 0, 0)$ whenever $b_{MP} < \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r-\pi d}{2x}$.
2. $(0, 1, 0; 0, x)$ whenever $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r-\pi d}{2x} \leq b_{MP} \leq \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r-\pi d}{2x}$ and $b_L < \frac{x}{2}$
3. $(0, 1, 0; x, x)$ and $(x, 0, 0; x, x)$ whenever $b_{MP} > \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r-\pi d}{2x}$.
4. $(x, 0, 1; 0, x)$ whenever $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r-\pi d}{2x} \leq b_{MP} \leq \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r-\pi d}{2x}$ and $b_L \geq \frac{x}{2}$

Proposition .2 *If the Leader is dealing with a high clout MP, the following strategy profiles form a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium:*

1. $(0, 0, 0; 0, 0)$ whenever $b_{MP} < \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x}$ and $b_L < \frac{x}{2}$
2. $(x, 0, 0; 0, 0)$ whenever $b_{MP} < \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x}$ and $b_L \geq \frac{x}{2}$
3. $(0, 0, 0; 0, x)$ whenever $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r}{2x} \leq b_{MP} \leq \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x}$ and $b_L < \frac{x}{2}$
4. $(x, 0, 0; 0, x)$ whenever $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r}{2x} \leq b_{MP} \leq \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x}$ and $b_L \geq \frac{x}{2}$
5. $(0, 0, 0; x, x)$ whenever $b_{MP} > \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x}$ and $b_L < \frac{x}{2}$
6. $(x, 0, 0; x, x)$ whenever $b_{MP} > \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x}$ and $b_L \geq \frac{x}{2}$

Proof The Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the game $\langle N, S, U \rangle$ are calculated by backward induction. Note that in the last period of the game, L chooses to enforce discipline only on low clout MPs, because $-(b_L - a_{MP}^1)^2 - \pi V(d) \geq -(b_L - a_{MP}^1)^2$ if and only if $\pi < 0$. Given this, we analyze the cases in which the MPs follow the leadership's choice separately for the low and high clout MPs. In the case of the low clout MP, $BR_{MP}(x) = x$ iff $-(b_{MP} - x)^2 + r \geq -b_{MP}^2 + \pi d$, which is the case if and only if $b_{MP} \geq \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r - \pi d}{2x}$, while $BR_{MP}(0) = 0$ iff $-b_{MP}^2 + r > -(b_{MP} - x)^2 + \pi d$, which is the case if and only if $b_{MP} < \frac{x}{2} - \frac{r - \pi d}{2x}$. Thus, the best responses of the low clout MP fall into three regions:

1. If $b_{MP} < \frac{x}{2} - \frac{r - \pi d}{2x} \Rightarrow BR_{MP}(x) = BR_{MP}(0) = 0$
2. If $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r - \pi d}{2x} \leq b_{MP} \leq \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r - \pi d}{2x} \Rightarrow BR_{MP}(x) = x \wedge BR_{MP}(0) = 0$
3. $b_{MP} > \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r - \pi d}{2x} \Rightarrow BR_{MP}(x) = x \wedge BR_{MP}(0) = x$

Given these best responses, we proceed to find the optimal choice of the Leader. In region 1, L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a Low Clout MP if and only if $U_L(x, BR_{MP}(x)) \geq U_L(0, BR_{MP}(0))$, which is equivalent to $-b_L^2 - \pi \geq -b_L^2$, simplifying to $\pi \leq 0$, which is always the case, since in the low clout case, $\pi < 0$. In region 2, L will choose x over 0 whenever $U_L(x, x) \geq U_L(0, 0)$, equivalent to $-(b_L - x)^2 \geq -b_L^2$ which simplifies to $b_L \geq \frac{x}{2}$. In region 3, L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a low clout MP if and only if $U_L(x, x) \geq U_L(0, x)$, which is equivalent to $-(b_L - x)^2 \geq -(b_L - x)^2 - \pi$, simplifying to $\pi \geq 0$, which is always the case, since in the low clout case, $\pi < 0$.

In the case of the high clout MP, $BR_{MP}(x) = x$ iff $-(b_{MP} - x)^2 + r \geq -b_{MP}^2$, which is the case if and only if $b_{MP} \geq \frac{x}{2} - r2x$, while $BR_{MP}(0) = 0$ iff $-b_{MP}^2 + r > -(b_{MP} - x)^2$, which is the case if and only if $b_{MP} < \frac{x}{2} - r2x$. Thus, the best responses of the high clout MP fall into three regions:

1. If $b_{MP} < \frac{x}{2} - \frac{r}{2x} \Rightarrow BR_{MP}(x) = BR_{MP}(0) = 0$
2. If $\frac{x}{2} - \frac{r}{2x} \leq b_{MP} \leq \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x} \Rightarrow BR_{MP}(x) = x \wedge BRMP(0) = 0$
3. $b_{MP} > \frac{x}{2} + \frac{r}{2x} \Rightarrow BR_{MP}(x) = x \wedge BR_{MP}(0) = x$

Given these best responses, in analogy to the high clout case, we proceed to find the optimal choice of the Leader. In region 1, L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a high clout MP if and only if $U_L(x, BR_{MP}(x)) \geq U_L(0, BR_{MP}(0))$, which is equivalent to $-b_L^2 \geq -b_L^2$, which means both actions are optimal. In region 2, L will choose x over 0 whenever $U_L(x, x) \geq U_L(0, 0)$, equivalent to $-(b_L - x)^2 \geq -b_L^2$ which simplifies to $b_L \geq \frac{x}{2}$. In region 3, L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a low clout MP if and only if $U_L(x, x) \geq U_L(0, x)$, which is equivalent to $-(b_L - x)^2 \geq -(b_L - x)^2$, which means both actions are optimal.

Notes

¹Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. *Candidate selection in comparative perspective*. Sage, 1987; Michael Marsh. "The voters decide?: Preferential voting in European list systems". In: *European Journal of Political Research* 13.4 (1985), pp. 365–378.

²Ernesto Calvo. “The competitive road to proportional representation”. In: *World Politics* 61.02 (2009), pp. 254–295.

³Although we use the term “open list” here, the mechanics we describe are often present in “flexible list” systems. In such systems, voters lack total control over seat priority but can influence a party list’s rank order if candidate’s receive votes greater than a certain quota. Depending on their functioning, such systems can function similarly to open lists and indeed some systems are variably called “open” and “flexible” by different sources. While we focus here on the “pure” open list systems just defined, our arguments apply to all forms of list systems in which a mechanism exists to clearly contribute to a party’s success with one’s personal vote, creating the conditions we suggest would lead to resisting party pressures.

⁴John Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas”. In: *Electoral Studies* 14.4 (1995), pp. 417–439; Barry Ames. “Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* (1995), pp. 406–433.

⁵S. Bowler et al. *Party discipline and parliamentary government*. Ohio State University Press Columbus, 1999; M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle. “How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments”. In: *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government* (1999), pp. 23–48.

⁶Shaun Bowler and David M Farrell. “Legislator Shirking and Voter Monitoring: Impacts of European Parliament Electoral Systems upon Legislator-Voter Relationships”. In: *Journal of common market studies* 31.1 (1993), pp. 45–70; John M. Carey. *Legislative voting and accountability*. Cambridge Univ Pr, 2009; S. Hix. “Electoral institutions and legislative behavior”. In: *World politics* 56.2 (2004), pp. 194–223; Sam Depauw and Shane Martin. “Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective”. In: *Intra-party politics and coalition governments*. Ed. by Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit. Vol. 103120. 2009; Scott W. Desposato. “The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies”. en. In: *Journal of Politics* 68.4 (Nov. 2006), pp. 1018–1030; Emanuel Emil Coman. “Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33 National Chambers”. In: *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 21.3 (July 2015), pp. 360–389.

⁷Ulrich Sieberer. “Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis”. In: *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 12.02 (2006), pp. 150–178.

⁸Matthew Søberg Shugart, Melody Ellis Valdini, and Kati Suominen. “Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation”. en. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 49.2 (Apr. 2005), pp. 437–449; Miriam A. Golden and Lucio Picci. “Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–94”. en. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 52.2 (2008), pp. 268–289; Barry Ames. *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in Comparative Politics*. 2001.

⁹Alan Renwick and Jean-Benoit Pilet. *Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

¹⁰Monika Nalepa. “Party Institutionalization and Legislative Organization: The Evolution of Agenda Power in the Polish Parliament”. In: *Comparative Politics* 48.3 (2016), pp. 353–+.

¹¹Note that candidates may appear in a specific order on the ballot, but this does not directly effect the outcome except where voters may disproportionately cast votes for candidates located on the top of the ballot. In some OLPR systems, the ballot ordering is not apparent to the voter.

¹²John M. Carey. “Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 51.1 (2007), pp. 92–107; Carey, *Legislative voting and accountability*; James R. Hollyer, Marko Klasnja, and Rocio Titiumik. “Parties as Disciplinarians”. San Francisco, CA, 2015.

¹³Miriam A. Golden and Eric C. C. Chang. “Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy”. In: *World Politics* 53.4 (July 2001), pp. 588–622; Barry Ames. “Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress”. English. In: *The Journal of Politics* 57.2 (1995), pp. 324–343; Jose Antonio Cheibub and Gisela Sin. “Order in Chaos Intra Party Coordination in Open List PR Systems”. Madrid, Spain, 2015; Denise Traber, Simon Hug, and Pascal Sciarini. “Party unity in the Swiss Parliament: the electoral connection”. In: *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 20.2 (2014), pp. 193–215.

¹⁴Sieberer, “Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies”; Coman, “Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments”.

¹⁵Keith Krehbiel. “Where’s the Party?” In: *British Journal of Political Science* 23.2 (1993), pp. 235–266.

¹⁶Shane Martin. “Why electoral systems don’t always matter: The impact of ‘mega-seats’ on legislative behaviour in Ireland”. en. In: *Party Politics* (2012); Naofumi Fujimura. “Electoral incentives, party discipline, and legislative organization: manipulating legislative committees to win elections and maintain party unity”. In: *European Political Science Review* 4.2 (July 2012), pp. 147–175.

¹⁷Giacomo Benedetto and Simon Hix. “The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001-2005 British House of Commons”. en. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 40.7 (July 2007), pp. 755–781; Rudy B. Andeweg and Jacques Thomassen. “Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament”. en. In: *Party Politics* 17.5 (Sept. 2011), pp. 655–672; Bowler et al., *Party discipline and parliamentary government*.

¹⁸Michael Gallagher. “The Political Impact of Electoral System Change in Japan and New Zealand, 1996”. In: *Party Politics* 4.2 (1998), pp. 203–228; Scott Morgenstern. *Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States*. en. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

¹⁹Donald E. Stokes. “Spatial models of party competition”. In: *American political science review* 57.02 (1963), pp. 368–377; Matthew K. Buttice and Walter J. Stone. “Candidates matter: Policy and quality differences in congressional elections”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 74.3 (2012), pp. 870–887; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, “Looking for Locals”; B. Cain, J. Ferejohn, and M. Fiorina. *The personal vote*. Harvard University Press, 1987.

²⁰Carey, “Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting”; Peter Buisseret and Carlo Prato. “Electoral Accountability in Multi-Member Districts”. In: *Paper Presented at the Fifth Annual Formal Theory and Comparative Politics at Emory in Atlanta, 2017*.

²¹Scott Mainwaring and Timothy. Scully. *Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America*. Stanford University Press, 1995.

²²Carey, *Legislative voting and accountability*.

²³Justin Fox and Kenneth W. Shotts. “Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 71.04 (2009), pp. 1225–1237.

²⁴J. Kam Christopher. *Party discipline and Parliamentary politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

²⁵Mainwaring and Scully, *Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America*.

²⁶Carey, *Legislative voting and accountability*.

²⁷We lack the data to operationalize the distance between the two policy proposals in the empirical analysis below. Note, however, that the closer policy x is from 0, which can be interpreted as the status quo, the greater the region where the leadership can secure loyalty, as the central region in Figure 1 decreases in x . This empirical implication allows us to predict what would happen if the choice of policy x were not exogenous, but chosen by the leadership. A leader maximizing party unity as demonstrated in the voting record would set the agenda with policies that are close to the status quo.

²⁸Anna Gwiazda. “Poland’s Quasi-Institutionalized Party System: The Importance of Elites and Institutions”. In: *Perspectives on European Politics* 102.02 (2009), pp. 350–376; Frances Millard. “Executive–Legislative Relations in Poland, 1991–2005: Institutional Relations in Transition”. In: *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 14.4 (2008), pp. 367–393.

²⁹In Poland, the adoption of OLPR itself was intended to demote the importance of parties. While many politicians hoped to capitalize on their personal followings, the Communist authoritarian party (the Polish United Workers Party) believed that a party-centered electoral system would empower Lech Walesa’s ten million strong dissident trade union “Solidarity,” which the Communists government had banned seven years earlier during the Martial Law Regime.

³⁰Unlike in many chambers where roll calls are selectively recorded (Simon Hug. “Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes”. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 40.01 [2010], pp. 225–235; Clifford J. Carrubba et al. “Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative Votes, Selection Bias and Roll-Call Vote Analysis”. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 36.04 [2006], pp. 691–704), the Sejm since 1997 has been recording and making public all the votes cast in the Chamber.

³¹As the quote from our elite interview cited in section indicates, parties consider loyalty and unity a value in and of itself. That is, parties demand loyalty of low clout MPs even in votes where their disloyalty would not cause a party to lose on final passage. Even in a still institutionalizing party system, unity earns parties the reputation of an organization that is capable of delivering the collective benefits it was created for in the first place (John Herbert Aldrich and David W. Rohde. *Measuring conditional party government*.

PIPC, Political Institutions, Public Choice, a program of Michigan State University's Institute for Public Policy, and Social Research, 1998). For this reason, we do not try to identify more and less important votes.

³²Scott Mainwaring and Anibal Perez-Linan. "Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress". In: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22.4 (1997), pp. 453–483.

³³Interviews with sources in the Polish Sejm and analysis of archival materials suggests that abstentions were the most common form of disloyalty against the party, due to harsh formal penalties for explicitly voting against the party (including fines and expulsion from the party caucus). Still, while it was typical for MPs to avoid votes, their presence for voting sessions was officially obligatory, with numerous reminders issued by the caucus whips and possibly sanctions. Thus abstentions were costly enough not to occur without reason, but are frequent enough to function as the main form of party disloyalty.

³⁴MPs who are independents (not members of any party) are excluded from the sample as are those members that switch parties during the term from the party list on which they were initially elected. MPs who leave their party would not have the dynamic we model above in which their importance in the next election constrains the party leaders. Moreover, their behavior in terms of voting and bill submission is not comparable to other members, as it is limited only to a portion of the term. MPs from small parties with less than 15 members are excluded in order to maintain comparability

³⁵As one Polish MP commented, "It's an important instrument of control to offer someone a spot on the list and assign them to a district" (Jaruga-Nowacka, interview 2009).

³⁶B.F. Crisp, K. Kanthak, and J. Leijonhufvud. "The reputations legislators build: With whom should representatives collaborate?" In: *American Political Science Review* 98.4 (2004), pp. 703–716.

³⁷After the period under study, changes to party internal restrictions in sponsorship behavior make later data inappropriate to serve as a proxy for individual MP preferences.

³⁸Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud, "The reputations legislators build: With whom should representatives collaborate?"; Eduardo Alemán et al. "Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll-Call Ideal Points". In: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34.1 (2009), pp. 87–116; Tiffany D. Barnes. "Gender and legislative preferences: Evidence from the Argentine provinces". In: *Politics & Gender* 8.04 (2012), pp. 483–507; Gregory Koger. "Position taking and cosponsorship in the US House". In: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28.2 (2003), pp. 225–246.

³⁹Barry Ames. "Party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies". In: *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. Ed. by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. Cambridge University Press New York, 2002, pp. 185–221; Frank Thames. "A House Divided, Party Strength and the Mandate Divide in Hungary, Russia and Ukraine". In: *Comparative Political Studies* 38.03 (2006), pp. 282–303; F. C. Thames. "Discipline and Party Institutionalization in Post-Soviet Legislatures". In: *Party Politics* 13.4 (2007), p. 456; Carey, *Legislative voting and accountability*; Santiago Olivella and Margit Tavits. "Legislative Effects of Electoral Mandates". In: *British Journal of Political Science* FirstView (2013), pp. 1–21; M. Tavits. "The Making of Mavericks Local Loyalties and Party Defection". In: *Comparative Political Studies* 42.6 (2009), pp. 793–815.

⁴⁰Krehbiel, "Where's the Party?"

⁴¹Mainwaring and Scully, *Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America*; Bonnie N. Field and Peter M. Siavelis. "Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional Polities A Research Note". en. In: *Party Politics* 14.5 (Sept. 2008), pp. 620–639; Thames, "Discipline and Party Institutionalization in Post-Soviet Legislatures"; Conor O'Dwyer. "Runaway state building: how political parties shape states in postcommunist Eastern Europe". In: *World Politics* 56.04 (2004), pp. 520–553; Kenneth M Roberts and Erik Wibbels. "Party systems and electoral volatility in Latin America: a test of economic, institutional, and structural explanations". In: *American Political Science Review* (1999), pp. 575–590; Sarah Birch. "Electoral systems and party system stability in post-communist Europe". In: *97th Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30th August-2nd Sept. 2001*; Eleanor Neff Powell and Joshua A Tucker. "Revisiting electoral volatility in postcommunist countries: New data, new results and new approaches". In: *British Journal of Political Science* 44.01 (2014), pp. 123–147; Laurentiu Stefan, Sergiu Gherghina, and Mihail Chiru. "We all agree that we disagree too much: attitudes of Romanian MPs towards party discipline". In: *East European Politics* 28.2 (2012), pp. 180–192; Margit Tavits. "Power within Parties: The Strength of the Local Party and MP Independence in Postcommunist Europe". en. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 55.4 (2011), pp. 923–936.