


Electronic Appendix

Appendix A - Elite-level infiltration

While our main analysis focuses on the drivers and consequences of infiltration at the rank-and-file level, we will here briefly discuss the dynamics of elite-level infiltration. The Recovered Territories had no bishops, because following the redrawing of Polish borders, the German bishops placed there by the Vatican had been forcefully expelled along with the rest of the German population. Since the Vatican refused to appoint Polish bishops to the Recovered Territories, the Communists appointed cherry-picked clerics as apostolic administrators in those areas (Potkaj 2002) and demanded that the Vatican recognize them as bishops (OSI, 1950). This, arguably, aided in the infiltration attempts of the rank and file of the Catholic Church in the recovered territories. To capture elite infiltration, we constructed an original database of Polish bishops and apostolic administrators from 1946-1990. We code a województwo as having had a “Patriot Bishop” if during the peak period of Patriot Priest activity, it belonged to a diocese that was either run by a Patriot Priest ally or if the bishop in the diocese was prevented by the regime from fulfilling his duties and the vicar general (*wikariusz kapitularny*) was a Patriot Priest. We corroborated our classification of Patriot Bishops with the work of Richard Staar (1956).




We test the drivers of elite infiltration using the same approach as for rank-and-file infiltration, by regressing the presence of a “Patriot Priest” in the leadership of the diocese on our indicator of organizational vulnerability as well as the main alternative explanations (imperial legacies and socio-economic development). The patterns in Figure A2, which are based on the regression in Table A2 in Appendix D, reinforce our conclusions from the main analysis: elite-level infiltration was significantly higher in areas with higher organizational vulnerability, but once again we find weaker support for the role of imperial legacies and socio-economic development (with the partial exception of education).

As briefly discussed in the main document, Figure 3 suggests that the anti-communist effects of church attendance were weaker in areas where the church leadership had been infiltrated by red priests in the 1950s. Thus, the attitudinal consequences of elite-level infiltration broadly mirrored those of rank-and-file infiltration, but the effects were substantively smaller and statistically weaker for the former than the latter. There are three possible explanations for


this difference: first, it is possible that despite the hierarchical nature of the Catholic Church the attitudinal effects would be stronger when the communist infiltrators were priests and thus had direct contact with parishioners than if regime agents were higher up in the church hierarchy. Second, given that the high-level infiltration ended once the Vatican appointed new bishops to the former German dioceses in Poland, whereas many of the rank-and-file patriot priests remained in their positions for many years after the official end of the Patriot Priest campaign, the difference may simply reflect the greater length of the “infiltration treatment” at the rank-and-file level. Finally, the attitudinal effects differences may be driven by the fact that the elite level infiltration was more overt, since it happened in the context of repressive moves of the regime against the traditional Catholic Church leadership. To the extent that Catholic parishioners were aware of the details of these high-level political machinations, it is possible that the weaker attitudinal effects simply reflect the discounting dynamics at play when regular members are faced with overt infiltrators. While this last interpretation is in line with our theoretical discussion of the differences between overt and covert infiltration, the patterns need to be interpreted cautiously since our data do not allow us to disentangle these three explanations.

Map B2: Map of Patriot Priests in post-WWII Poland by wojewodztwa




Note: Authors’ calculations based on materials collected by Zurek (2003). The map uses administrative divisions from 1975.

Map B3: Borders of the Imperial Partitions Overlaid on a Contemporary Map of Poland



Map B4: Years of independence of the 49 wojewodztwa (current in the 1980s)

The country’s borders changed with (1) the rise of Napoleon, which resulted in the creation of a fairly independent “Duchy of Warsaw,” a small state erected in 1807 made up of six departments, expanded to ten in 1809; (2) Napoleon’s downfall, which resulted in downscaling the Duchy to a small, but still autonomous “Krakow Republic” and the “Polish Kingdom,” a euphemism for an extension of the Russian Partition; and (3) the Spring of Nations, which led to a major uprising in Małopolska that, after being crushed by the Habsburgs, put an end to the Krakow autonomy (Kieniewicz 1998). Finally, in 1918, Poland regained independence and recovered some of its territories subsumed by the partitions.



Map B5: Administrative Division of Poland in 1950 and 1975 (current in the 1980s)



The coding of our key variables of interest, such as migrant shares and Patriot Priests was complicated by the fact that the number of administrative regions in Poland changed from 17 in the 1950s to 49 in the 1980s. Therefore, for migrant shares, we had to use geo-referenced maps to convert our data on the numbers of settlers arriving to each 1950 województwo to migrant shares in each 1980 województwo. We then conducted similar operations on the Patriot Priests Variable. The map above illustrates the administrative divisions of Poland at the time our migrant data was collected (in dark red) and at the time the CBOS surveys were conducted (in light grey). Converting the Percent Migrant variable into a variable matching the 1975 województwa required a calculation of the proportion of each old województwo in the new województwo and a reweighing of the data to match the CBOS survey.

Appendix C: Information about the CBOS Surveys

The Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) was created when Poland's communist authorities came to the realization that relying on reports from the secret police alone left them unprepared for outbreaks of popular dissidence. The Martial Law scenario could have been avoided altogether had the authorities been adequately informed of popular support for the Solidarity trade union. Relying exclusively on the reports from Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB), the state secret police was no longer feasible, because this data had informed the decision to legalize Solidarity. "Intelligence" provided by SB led the authorities to believe that Solidarity would be a marginalized movement with no more than a few hundred thousand members. To the communists' surprise, Solidarity membership exceeded nine million members in a matter of months (Holzer 1990, Lopinski et.al. 1990). As it turned out, SB's estimates were based on an outdated informer network that failed to keep up with the rapidly growing dissident community. Critically, the secret police lacked agents in many dissident cells that ended up fueling Solidarity membership upon legalization. At the same time, in the Polish United Workers Party—Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (*PZPR*), the official name of the Communist Party in Poland—membership was dwindling dramatically, as rank and file members surrendered their party IDs. By late 1981, PZPR's membership was barely a quarter of Solidarity's.

At that point, the communists responded in the only way they knew. In order to close the door on a foreign intervention to demobilize the dissident movement (resembling the Soviet and Warsaw Pact crackdowns in Hungary in 1956 and in Prague in 1968, respectively), on December 12th, 1981, the Polish communist military commanders introduced Martial Law and arrested over 10,000 members of the Solidarity leadership. In the winter of 1981, 18 months after the legalization of the independent trade union, not only the Polish communists, but also leaders

from the Warsaw Pact countries were worried about the future of communism in Poland. The trade union itself was outlawed alongside smaller independent organizations. A curfew hour was introduced; all telephone conversations became closely monitored and national borders were sealed. The military reinstated a six-day working week and placed mass media, public administration, health services, power stations, coal mines, and key industrial plants as well as the transportation network under its management (Paczkowski 2008).

The provisions of Martial Law stayed in place until July 22, 1983. Even before the restrictions of the military regime began to be lifted (which happened gradually throughout 1982), the lesson learned was clear: the regime needed alternative sources of information to SB reports about the political views of Polish citizens. A set of 17 nationally representative public opinion surveys between 1985-90, ten of which are analyzed here, is the by-product of this realization of the communist regime (Kwiatkowski, 2004).

While the political consequences of this recognition are beyond the scope of this article,¹ the byproduct of the regime's realization is. The polling company CBOS was given a fair amount of autonomy in running the surveys, which allays potential concerns that the poll design may have been biased to produce results favorable to the communist regime (Kwiatkowski 2004). Among other strategies, the managerial positions of CBOS were staffed by sociologists from Warsaw University's IFiS, the relatively independent social science department, whose team of sociologists under the leadership of Stefan Nowak and Wojciech Adamski started conducting public opinion poll surveys during the 18 month period when Solidarity was a legal trade union.

These surveys provide us with a unique insight into one of the most fascinating episodes of 20th century political history and more broadly into the temporal dynamics of regime and opposition support in a country undergoing the transition from a relatively consolidated authoritarianism in late 1985 to a fledgling democracy by early 1990 (Adamski 1982).

While we address the important question of response bias to surveys conducted in authoritarian setting in greater detail below, we may wonder how representative they are of the general Polish population at the time of the surveys. Through documents obtained from CBOS and interviews with current CBOS staff who are still working at the polling company or have recently retired, we were able to reconstruct many details of the sampling procedure used in the early 1980s. The stratification was done by dividing the country into 49 layers, corresponding to the 49 regions (województwa). This was followed by classifying the localities in each region into one of three categories: województwo capital, other towns/cities, and villages. In addition, the layer with the nation's capital, Warsaw, was divided into "Center" and "Periphery." This resulted in 150 primary sampling units accounting for the (1) administrative division of the country in 1985-1989; (2) the type of locale (województwo capital, non-capital city, village); (3) historical/geographical divisions. The secondary sampling units were addresses sampled using random number generators with uniform distributions. The sampling units in the third stage were adults permanently living at the addresses sampled in the second sampling stage. Enumerators used the Kish selection grid to choose the adult who would participate in the face-to-face survey. The number of addresses sampled in each of the primary sampling units was matched to reflect data from the Central Statistical Office.

Although, this procedure should result in a nationally representative sample, to ensure that the final sample was also representative of Poles across województwa in 1985-1989, we

compared it with regard to basic demographics to data from statistical yearbooks, published annually in Poland. This yearbook provided three types of information disaggregated across wojewodztwa: the proportion of females, the proportions of urban, as opposed to village dwellers, and the proportion of the population below 18 and of “production age” (between 18 and retirement). This allowed us to create matching categories in our survey data, using the age of respondents, their gender and the size of their locality. In the case of “production age” we had to account for the fact that Polish women were able to retire earlier than men (at age 59 as opposed to 64). We also had to account for the fact that the survey was not conducted with Poles under 18. Thus, in order to make the census share of retirees comparable to the survey share of retirees, we expressed the census percentage of retirees as a proportion of the percentage of (1-% under 18-year olds) in a given wojewodztwo. In order to compare the mean values of respondents in each wojewodztwo in our surveys to the yearbook data, we created 7 (for 7 surveys)*3 (for three demographic variables) paired vectors: $(s_1, s_2, s_3, \dots, s_{49})$; $(c_1, c_2, c_3, \dots, c_{49})$, where s_i represents the survey mean in wojewodztwo i and c_i represents the census mean in wojewodztwo i . We then calculated the standard deviation around the mean for each wojewodztwo in each survey and used those standard errors to compare the vectors of means in a Hausman test, in R using the following formula:

```
Haus<-function (c,s,sd,n) {
  se <- sd/sqrt(n)
  t(c-s) %*% diag(se**2) %*% (c-s)
},
```

where c is the census mean, s is the survey mean, sd is the standard deviation around the mean in a given wojewodztwo and n is the number of observations per wojewodztwo. The function Haus

follows a chi-square distribution with 48 (49-1 wojewodztwa) degrees of freedom and is used to test the joint hypothesis that the vector of sample means does not differ from the Census values. Using this test, we were able to reject this hypothesis in the case of all city means, all retirement means, and one female mean (in the June 1985 survey). This meant that the surveys were not representative of the wojewodztwo population as far as the numbers of retirees and city dwellers were concerned, although they were ---with one exception---representative of the number of females per wojewodztwo. To remedy this problem, we created and applied to our data the following sets of weights. c_{it}^f/s_{ij}^f , c_{it}^m/s_{ij}^m , c_{it}^c/s_{ij}^c , c_{it}^v/s_{ij}^v , c_{it}^r/s_{ij}^r , c_{it}^p/s_{ij}^p . And thus, c_{it}^f/s_{ij}^f is the weight applied to females in wojewodztwo i in survey j , where c_{ij}^f is the average proportion of females in wojewodztwo i in year t and s_{ij}^f is the percentage of female respondents in wojewodztwo i in survey j . c_{it}^m/s_{ij}^m is the weight applied to males in wojewodztwo i , survey j , and c_{it}^c/s_{ij}^c , c_{it}^v/s_{ij}^v are weights applied to respondents living in cities and villages, respectively. Finally, c_{it}^r/s_{ij}^r and c_{it}^p/s_{ij}^p are the weights applied to retired respondents, and respondents of productive age, respectively. Here again, instead of using the raw percentage of retirees from the census, we used the proportion of retirees divided by 1-(18 and younger), to account for the fact that our survey does not include any respondents below 18 years of age.

These weights were applied to all situations where our Hausman tests rejected the null hypothesis that the means from the census and survey come from the same population, testing each hypothesis jointly for all the wojewodztwa in the survey.

Appendix D Summary Statistics and Full Regression Results

Table D1: Summary Statistics

| Variable | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|------|------|
| Net Communist Support | 10804 | 0.53 | .24 | 0 | 1 |
| Percent Migrants | 10804 | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.04 | 0.98 |
| Percent International Migrants | 10804 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.42 |
| Russia | 10804 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Prussia | 10804 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Years Independent before 1939 | 10804 | 21.14 | 13.13 | 0 | 58 |
| Patriot Priests (rank and file) | 10804 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.27 |
| Red Bishops | 10804 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Capital investments | 10804 | 29.69 | 11.30 | 7.4 | 67.5 |
| Heavy production | 10804 | 25.51 | 11.50 | 3.9 | 51.8 |
| Light production | 10804 | 12.29 | 11.86 | 1.8 | 49.5 |
| Agricultural production | 10804 | 23.26 | 13.96 | 3.2 | 65.8 |
| Church Attendance | 10804 | 1.32 | 0.76 | 0 | 2 |
| Primary Education | 10804 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Secondary Education | 10804 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Higher education | 10804 | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| Village | 10804 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Small town | 10804 | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium town | 10804 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| Large town | 10804 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| City | 10804 | 0.10 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Occupation | 10804 | 9.60 | 5.75 | 0 | 18 |
| Gender | 10804 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 10800 | 43.26 | 15.72 | 17 | 92 |
| Survey date (in months) | 10804 | 47.02 | 16.13 | 24 | 67 |
| Survey date (in months) squared | 10804 | 2470.68 | 1462.67 | 576 | 4489 |

Table D2: Infiltration drivers

| VARIABLES | (1) Patriot priest share | (2) Patriot priest share | (3) Patriot priest share | (4) Patriot priest share | (5) Patriot Bishop presence | (6) Patriot Bishop presence | (7) Patriot Bishop presence | (8) Patriot Bishop presence |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Prussian empire | | .090** (.015) | | .024 (.016) | | .150 (.155) | | -.146 (.210) |
| Russian empire | | .022 (.015) | | .021# (.012) | | -.250 (.154) | | -.181 (.158) |
| Organizational vulnerability | .044** (.004) | | | .039** (.006) | .193** (.056) | | | .194* (.081) |
| Industrialization 1950 | | | -.023 (.015) | -.004 (.010) | | | .148 (.130) | .133 (.135) |
| Urbanization 1950 | | | .291** (.068) | .095# (.053) | | | .981 (.588) | .432 (.695) |
| Education 1950 | | | .010 (.006) | -.008# (.004) | | | -.030 (.052) | -.109# (.059) |
| Observations | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 |
| R-squared | .679 | .541 | .381 | .784 | .204 | .208 | .274 | .407 |

Standard errors in parentheses

** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table D3: Infiltration consequences

| VARIABLES | (1) Church attendance | (2) Catholic church trust | (3) Net communist support | (4) Net communist support |
|--|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| %Patriot Priests | -.448 (.826) | .735 (.651) | -.520* (.218) | -.379 (.303) |
| Patriot bishop | .017 (.054) | .060 (.089) | -.038 (.028) | -.028 (.033) |
| Organizational vulnerability index | -.043 (.028) | -.013 (.047) | -.018 (.016) | -.018 (.015) |
| Prussian empire | -.180* (.071) | .139 (.131) | .080* (.032) | .076* (.030) |
| Russian empire | -.210** (.060) | .104 (.116) | -.006 (.030) | -.005 (.029) |
| Village | .079** (.024) | .177** (.059) | .026 (.020) | .024 (.020) |
| Church attendance | | .496** (.059) | -.063** (.014) | -.035# (.019) |
| %Patriot Priests# Church attendance | | -.265 (.474) | .265** (.101) | .129 (.171) |
| Patriot bishop# Church attendance | | -.008 (.051) | .020 (.013) | -.001 (.019) |
| Organizational vulnerability index# Church attendance | | -.003 (.032) | .010 (.007) | .010 (.006) |
| Prussian empire# Church attendance | | -.045 (.086) | -.029# (.016) | -.026# (.015) |
| Russian empire #Church attendance | | -.016 (.056) | .008 (.012) | .008 (.011) |
| Village# Church attendance | | -.046 (.030) | .004 (.008) | .004 (.008) |
| Born pre-1950#%Patriot Priests | | | | -.204 (.335) |
| Born pre-1950#Church attendance | | | | -.045* (.020) |
| Born pre-1950# %Patriot Priests# Church attendance | | | | .197 (.229) |
| Patriot bishop#Born pre-1950 | | | | -.008 (.029) |
| Patriot bishop#Born pre- 1950#Church attendance | | | | .028 (.020) |
| Born pre-1950 | | | | .070* (.030) |
| Demographic controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District economic controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 14,016 | 12,302 | 10,800 | 10,800 |
| Number of groups | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 |

Appendix E Reporting results for disaggregated vulnerability indicators

In the main text we test Hypothesis 1 using an index of organizational vulnerability, which was composed of three different components: the share of migrants, the years of independence from 1797-1939 and whether the wojewodztwo belonged to a diocese where there was a bishop vacancy in the aftermath of WWII due to the former German bishops being forced to leave (along with the rest of the German population) and the Vatican refusing to appoint replacements.

In Table A4 we report the results of regressions using the individual index components. In the first three models, we use each of the three index components separately, and find that all three indicators emerge as statistically significant predictors in the expected direction: infiltration was higher in areas with higher migrant shares, a shorter history of independent Polish statehood and in areas with bishop vacancies. However, as the r-squared for the first three models suggest, the we can explain the largest share of the variation in the DV in model 1 (using migrant shares) and the lowest share in model 2 (using years of independence). These differences are also confirmed in the subsequent models: migrant shares continue to be significant irrespective of whether we add the other two vulnerability indicators, while the robustness is weakest for *years of independence*, and intermediate for *bishop vacancy*, which is significant in model 6 but not in models 5 and 7. However, given that the three variables that make up the index have pairwise correlations ranging from .83 to .93, the models combining multiple index components have high multi-collinearity and need to be interpreted very cautiously.

Table E1: Organizational vulnerability and infiltration (disaggregated results)

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|------------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Migrant share | .115** (.016) | | | .117** (.023) | .113** (.037) | | .115** (.041) |
| Years Indep 1797-1939 | | -.002** (.001) | | .000 (.001) | | -.000 (.001) | .000 (.001) |
| Bishop vacancy | | | .075** (.013) | | .002 (.027) | .066** (.017) | .002 (.027) |
| Prussian empire | .021 (.015) | .046* (.018) | .033* (.016) | .021 (.015) | .021 (.015) | .030# (.016) | .021 (.016) |
| Russian empire | .018 (.011) | .026# (.015) | .018 (.013) | .017 (.012) | .018 (.011) | .020 (.013) | .017 (.012) |
| Industrialization 1950 | -.003 (.010) | -.002 (.012) | -.008 (.011) | -.003 (.010) | -.003 (.010) | -.007 (.011) | -.003 (.010) |
| Urbanization 1950 | .068 (.050) | .104 (.064) | .106# (.055) | .067 (.051) | .069 (.052) | .107# (.055) | .068 (.053) |
| Education 1950 | -.003 (.004) | -.008 (.005) | -.009# (.005) | -.003 (.004) | -.003 (.005) | -.010* (.005) | -.003 (.005) |
| Observations | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 |
| R-squared | .809 | .685 | .766 | .809 | .809 | .771 | .809 |

Table E2: Organizational vulnerability and infiltration (disaggregated results with standardized variables)

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|------------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Migrant share | .109** (.015) | | | .110** (.021) | .106** (.035) | | .108** (.038) |
| Years Indep 1797-1939 | | -.112** (.029) | | .004 (.032) | | -.029 (.033) | .004 (.033) |
| Bishop vacancy | | | .075** (.013) | | .002 (.027) | .066** (.017) | .002 (.027) |
| Prussian empire | .021 (.015) | .046* (.018) | .033* (.016) | .021 (.015) | .021 (.015) | .030# (.016) | .021 (.016) |
| Russian empire | .018 (.011) | .026# (.015) | .018 (.013) | .017 (.012) | .018 (.011) | .020 (.013) | .017 (.012) |
| Industrialization 1950 | -.003 (.010) | -.002 (.012) | -.008 (.011) | -.003 (.010) | -.003 (.010) | -.007 (.011) | -.003 (.010) |
| Urbanization 1950 | .068 (.050) | .104 (.064) | .106# (.055) | .067 (.051) | .069 (.052) | .107# (.055) | .068 (.053) |
| Education 1950 | -.003 (.004) | -.008 (.005) | -.009# (.005) | -.003 (.004) | -.003 (.005) | -.010* (.005) | -.003 (.005) |
| Observations | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 |
| R-squared | .809 | .685 | .766 | .809 | .809 | .771 | .809 |

Appendix F – Assessing bias in authoritarian surveys

A potentially serious concern in interpreting surveys conducted in authoritarian regimes is that respondents may not answer political questions truthfully out of fear of the possible consequences of airing anti-regime attitudes in a semi-public setting.² While the Polish regime was arguably considerably more tolerant of dissenting political views than most other East European communist regimes,³ it is nevertheless likely that some respondents expected that survey results would not be kept confidential and that revealing anti-regime views could have negative consequences for them and their families. Such potential biases can be addressed at the survey design stage through a variety of recent methodological innovations meant to elicit truthful responses to sensitive questions (Adida et. al. 2016, Blades and Gillum 2013, Jiang and Yang 2016) However, such techniques were not used in the CBOS surveys from three decades ago.

Therefore, we had to take a different approach to testing whether our main statistical findings are affected by biased survey responses. To do so we used a survey question, which asked respondents: “Were you between August 1980 and December 1981 a member of the Solidarity trade union.” This was a politically sensitive question, since Solidarity was outlawed with the introduction of Martial Law in December 1981, when its members were imprisoned, and was not re-legalized until 1989. Quite remarkably, in the surveys during the time frame of our analysis (late 1985-mid 1989), the proportion of survey respondents who identified as former

² We characterize the interview process as a semi-public setting because even though the interviews took place at the respondent's home and respondents were assured of the anonymity and privacy of the responses, the interviewers were nevertheless strangers for (most of) the respondents, and could have possibly been viewed as being agents of the state.

³ An East European joke from the 1980s nicely illustrates this point: A Polish and a Czech dog meet at the border, each intending to cross the border into the other country. The Czech dog asks the Polish one why he's trying to go to Czechoslovakia, and the Polish dog replies that he would like to eat sausage for once. The Czech dog replies that he's crossing into Poland because he would like to be able to bark for once!

Solidarity members was quite consistent (ranging from 21-26%) and did not exhibit a clear time trend, which suggests that responses were not depressed by fear before 1989 and or inflated by social desirability after Solidarity was re-legalized in 1989.

But while the discussion so far suggests that response bias was not a serious problem in the CBOS surveys, for the purpose of our analysis the key question is whether any such bias could account for the empirical patterns in our statistical analysis. Thus, given that our key finding is that the political effects of church attendance vary across different parts of Poland (as a function of church infiltration), the most important inferential concern for the purposes of the current analysis is that our findings could be driven by geographic variations in response bias. To test this possibility, in Table F1 we regress our indicators of response bias (Solidarity membership) on the two main explanatory variables in our main statistical analysis: church infiltration (% Patriot Priests) and church attendance. All models include the same demographic and district level control variables used in the rest of the analysis, and were run using multi-level mixed effects probit models. In addition, we included controls for Solidarity membership density at the district level, which we calculated using data extracted from the Encyclopedia of Solidarity, which reports in separate chapters for each Solidarity district the membership count before the introduction of Martial Law that disbanded Solidarity.⁴

⁴ It is reassuring to note that these district-level official membership rates have a positive and significant effect on survey-based Solidarity membership answers (even once we control for demographic and developmental differences), which further increases our confidence in the validity of our survey responses.

The results in Table F1 provide no evidence that respondents from areas with high “Patriot priest” shares were more likely to express falsified preferences, i.e. to under-report their Solidarity membership. Thus, according to model 1, respondents from high-infiltration areas were no less likely to report being Solidarity members. Model 2, which includes an interaction term between Patriot Priest shares and church attendance, further suggests that church attendance effects were not significantly different in low vs. high-infiltration areas. Given that these models account for demographic and developmental differences across districts, the results in Table F1 suggest that our statistical findings about the differential political effects of church attendance are not driven by difference in preference falsification in communist-era surveys.

Table F1: Response bias diagnostic tests

| | (1) Solidarity member | (2) Solidarity Member |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| %Patriot Priests | .669 (.674) | .272 (.845) |
| Church attendance | .174** (.023) | .144** (.044) |
| %Patriot Priests # Church attendance | | .310 (.396) |
| Official Solidarity membership rate | .685* (.282) | .697* (.283) |
| District-level economic controls | Yes | Yes |
| Demographic controls | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 8,785 | 8,785 |
| Number of groups | 49 | 49 |

Appendix G: Robustness check: border wojewodztwa

Table G1: Organizational infiltration and borders

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Organizational vulnerability | .039** (.006) | .040** (.006) | .040** (.006) | .040** (.006) | .039** (.007) |
| Border (any) | | -.013 (.009) | | | |
| Land border | | | -.011 (.008) | | |
| New land border | | | | -.006 (.009) | |
| German border | | | | | .001 (.017) |
| Prussian empire | .024 (.016) | .018 (.016) | .020 (.016) | .023 (.016) | .024 (.016) |
| Russian empire | .021# (.012) | .014 (.013) | .016 (.013) | .018 (.013) | .021# (.012) |
| Industrialization 1950 | -.004 (.010) | -.009 (.011) | -.006 (.010) | -.006 (.011) | -.004 (.010) |
| Urbanization 1950 | .095# (.053) | .116* (.054) | .101# (.053) | .095# (.053) | .095# (.053) |
| Education 1950 | -.008# (.004) | -.005 (.005) | -.007 (.005) | -.008 (.005) | -.008 (.005) |
| Observations | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 |
| R-squared | .784 | .795 | .793 | .787 | .784 |

Standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.1

The tests in Table G1 address a potential alternative explanation for subnational variations in church infiltration by the communist regime. This explanation focuses on the possibility that the Polish state may have had security-based differential incentives for how to target its infiltration efforts. Thus, it is conceivable that given the high geopolitical insecurity resulting in dramatic border changes in the wake of World War II, the regime may have been more concerned about establishing political control in the border areas. To test this possibility, we checked whether our infiltration drivers' results are robust to controlling for this alternative explanation.

To do so, we start with the fully specified rank-and-file infiltration drivers model (model 4 in Table A2), which is reproduced as a baseline in model 1 above, and then add dummy variables

that capture different definitions of potentially salient borders. The first version of the variable (model 2), includes all of Poland's border wojewodztwa (both land and sea). The second version (model 3) only includes wojewodztwa with land borders to neighboring countries to allow for the possibility that the regime may be less concerned about sea borders. The third version (model 4) focuses on wojewodztwa on newly established international borders (i.e. with the Soviet Union in the East and East Germany in the West.) The fourth version (model 5) only includes the border with East Germany, since it demarcated the newly acquired "recovered territories", which the regime may have been most concerned about consolidating. The results in Table G1 provide no evidence that church infiltration was more prevalent in border areas (irrespective of how we define these borders.) More importantly, Table G1 shows that our main findings about the importance of organizational vulnerability are remarkably robust in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance.

Appendix H: Evidence from *Kuznica Kaplanska* (“Priest Smithy” and *Ksiadz Obywatel* “Citizen Priest”)

Two bi-weekly periodicals were accessed at the Hoover Institute at Stanford in 2017-2018. The Institute has almost a complete collection of all issues published during the time the Patriot Priests were active, including *Ksiadz Obywatel* (appearing in 1950) and *Kuznica Kaplanska* (appearing in 1953-1956). Both were official newsletters of Patriot Priests that were part of ZBOWiD. Priests publishing in *Ksiadz Obywatel* were excommunicated within a year, which led to the creation of its successor periodical (*Glos Kaplana*, which we do not have) and eventually when the *Glos Kaplana* editorial board was excommunicated, *Kuznica Kaplanska* became the periodical of ZBOWiD priests, but authors would publish in it anonymously and the identity of the board members was not revealed. One of the authors read all the issues available to us and classified of content into several categories:

- 1) Polarizing messages indicating that it is impossible to remain neutral in light of current political tensions: one is either in support of capitalist, Western and bourgeoisie values or socialist and progressive ones.
- 2) Messages indicating that biblical content is fully compatible with Marxist philosophy
- 3) Anti-Western (also Anti-bourgeoise and Anti-fascist) content
- 4) Militant defense of Recovered territories

The table below provides sample key quotes from articles corresponding to these categories. The quotes were translated from Polish by one of the authors. All original articles are on file in .pdf format with one of the authors.

| Periodical, Issue, Volume and Page Number | Category | Example |
|---|----------|---------|
|---|----------|---------|

| | | |
|------------------------|---|---|
| KO, 1(1), p. 6 | Polarizing message | “Unfortunately, in today’s conditions, our priests have to hide their democratic convictions as far as civic duties are concerned because they would fall out of favor with the Episcopate” |
| KK, vol 1 (1), pp. 6-7 | Polarizing message | “The development of world ideational trends put every thinking human before the following two alternative: either he supports the camp of war or the camp of peace; either he bring aid to hundreds of millions in Asia and Africa in their fight for independence, or he support forces who oppress them with colonial terror” |
| KK, vol 1 (1), pp 8 | Militant defense of RT | “The issue of defending our borders on the Oder and Nyssa from neo-Hitlerism and their supporters from across the Atlantic is what unites us in pursuing the interests of the Catholic Church and our progressive society alike” |
| KK, vol 1 (1), pp 11 | Anti-western content | “Western intelligence agencies are eagerly awaiting for Polish Catholicism to trip up in its settling of its relations with the Polish Pe0ple’s Republic. They are readying themselves to take advantage of our mistakes in a way that is compatible with American and Wermacht ideals.” |
| KK, vol 1 (1), pp 11 | Militant defense of RT | “Catholics from the recovered territories know well the historical responsibility they carry as these lands were returned to the Motherland as a result of War War II. We call these lands “recovered” as they are an organic part of our People’s Homeland” |
| KK, vol 1(2), pp 45 | Militant defense of RT | “The Recovered Territories are lands that have always been ours. The hands of the Polish People built settlements here, cities and churches. Polish people have prayed here with Polish priests in Polish” |
| KK, vol 1(3), pp.11 | Biblical Content compatible with Marxism-Leninism | “The Episcopate has been circulating preprinted sermons. These require corrections as they do not account for important holidays such as May 1, the celebration of workers or July 22, the celebration of the Poland’s liberation by the Soviet Union. These holidays need to be integrated into sermons either on the Sunday preceding the holiday or the sermon following it” |
| KK, vol 1 (1), pp 11 | Compatibility of Marxism and Catholicism | “The sphere of culture is the best evidence of the complete compatibility between the interests of the Church and of the Nation. There is no moral conflict between the two and there cannot be. Those to whom such a conflict is apparent are falling victims to conservative propaganda.” |
| KK, vol 1(2), pp. 44 | Polarizing message | “Each of us must make a choice and pick one side or the other. Either he cuts himself off from the camp of war and picks the camp with is choosing new conditions for the development of society and removing the threat of genocide or he supports the enemies of peace.” |
| KK, vol 3(2), pp.31 | Biblical Content compatible with Marxism-Leninism | “And so instead of alignment between the altar and the crown” which has become so morally compromised, instead of Solidarity with a disappearing world of capitalism, progressive priests are calling for solidarity with democratic forces. Christianity is uniquely predisposed to be that religion whose grassroots origins in folk culture are so well known.” |

In addition, many of the texts that seem to be exclusively religious in content, include in a conspicuous way references to current events. An excellent example is the description of the adoption of the dogma of the Ascension of Virgin Mary, which after taking the reader through the history worshipping Virgin Mary ends with “what an unacceptable transgression it is, however, to use dogmatic truths for the dirty war they are fighting against nations who wish to live in peace. We heard these incitements from the Madrid radio” KO, 1(1), p.19.

Finally, there are self-reflective pieces wherein members of the Patriot Priest organization claim credit for changing the attitudes and identities of those they had been preaching to:

“The issue of the Recovered Territories is an issue of all of us. We used to have three cultures here: the settlers from East of the Bug River, settlers from Central Poland and German Poles from Silesia and Pomerania, who survived germanization tactics of Bismarck. Although some local differences remain, for the most part the process of assimilation has been successful creating new lasting bonds. This is in no small part an accomplishment of the Catholic Church speaking in one united message from the altar and pulpit” (KK, vol 1 (1), pp p 19)

| Appendix I: Robustness Table II | (1): Varying intercepts | (2): OLS | (3): Communist support instead of Net com supp. | (4): Controlling for migrant shares |
|--|-------------------------|----------|---|-------------------------------------|
| Patriot Priests Share | -0.506* | -0.487* | -0.670* | -0.314 |
| | (0.211) | (0.189) | (0.314) | (0.293) |
| Church Attendance | -0.120** | -0.130** | -0.123* | -0.142** |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.051) | (0.022) |
| %Patriot Priests # Church attendance | 0.581** | 0.529* | 0.758 | 0.473# |
| | (0.221) | (0.213) | (0.469) | (0.253) |
| %Patriot Bishop | -0.029 | -0.038 | -0.080# | -0.035 |
| | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.043) | (0.029) |
| %Patriot Bishop # Church attendance | 0.027 | 0.039 | 0.081 | 0.038 |
| | (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.053) | (0.028) |
| Prussia | 0.087** | 0.081** | 0.160** | 0.084** |
| | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.057) | (0.031) |
| Russia | -0.005 | -0.013 | -0.008 | -0.010 |
| | (0.030) | (0.028) | (0.044) | (0.030) |
| Prussia# Church attendance | -0.077* | -0.059 | -0.125# | -0.055# |
| | (0.037) | (0.035) | (0.071) | (0.033) |
| Russia# Church attendance | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.029 | 0.018 |
| | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.041) | (0.023) |
| Mean (standardized items) | -0.022 | -0.023# | -0.032 | |
| | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.023) | |
| Organizational vulnerability # Church attendance | 0.025# | 0.017 | 0.037 | |
| | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.030) | |
| Heavy industrial production | -0.000 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.000 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| % Migrants | | | | -0.093 |
| | | | | (0.063) |
| % Migrants# Church attendance | | | | 0.063 |
| | | | | (0.055) |
| Occupation Controls | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Survey fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Observations | 10,800 | 10,800 | 10,052 | 10,800 |
| Number of groups | 49 | | 49 | 49 |
| R-squared | | 0.191 | | |

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