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What is This?
Tolerating Mistakes: How Do Popular Perceptions of Procedural Fairness Affect Demand for Transitional Justice?

Monika Nalepa

Abstract
How do perceptions of procedural fairness shape the preferences that citizens have for transitional justice (TJ) in postauthoritarian countries? This article uses original opinion poll data collected in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to investigate this question. It shows that differences in the demand for TJ are explained by how citizens perceive whether the TJ process commits errors—that is, whether the innocent are condemned (falsely convicted) or the guilty are exonerated (falsely acquitted). This is so even after accounting for threat perceptions of former autocrats and voting behavior. After comparing the ways in which citizens’ perceptions of errors in the TJ process shape their demand for lustration in the three postcommunist countries, the author discusses the implications of these findings for scholars of democratic consolidation, social psychologists, and policy makers designing TJ systems.

Keywords
transitional justice, procedural fairness, lustration, false acquittal, false conviction, postcommunist Europe

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Introduction: Mistakes in the Transitional Justice Process

Transitional Justice (TJ) refers broadly to procedures adopted to deal with members and collaborators of an ancien régime following a country’s transition from war to peace or from autocracy to democracy. TJ procedures can include, for example, trying former perpetrators, granting amnesty, issuing apologies, and effecting victim compensation schemes. They also frequently involve a variety of “truth revelation” programs under which so-called truth commissions open the former authoritarian police’s secret files and vet public officials to reveal any links those officials may have had to the former autocrats.

In postcommunist Europe, the prevalent truth revelation procedure is lustration. Almost all countries in postcommunist Europe that successfully transitioned to democracy have been pursuing lustration programs for at least ten years (Appel 2005; Choi and David 2006; Huyse 1995; Holmes 1994; Welsh 1996). In 2004–5, more than half of the respondents in representative, nationwide surveys of Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs agreed that lustration should continue. At the same time, as Figure 1 illustrates, attitudes toward lustration vary across as well as within these three countries.

Why do citizens in postcommunist countries continue to exhibit strong attitudes toward lustration? And what determines this variation? Conventional wisdom places TJ’s origins in the pretransition experience with authoritarian repression. People wronged by the old regime want to punish its members and collaborators to ensure that the new regime is free of ties to the ancien régime. According to early scholarship, the more severe the atrocities, the greater the TJ demand, regardless of when those atrocities occurred. If this were true, though, one would expect Hungarians to have greater demand than do Czechs, who should in turn be more demanding than do Poles. More recently, TJ scholars (Nino 1996; Elster 2004, 2006) have argued that fresh memories of atrocities trigger more intensified demand for TJ than human right violations that were temporally remote. If this were true, we would expect to see greater demand in Poland than in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and Czechs to have greater demand than do Hungarians.

Because these explanations for TJ demand fail to account for the actual patterns we observe in postcommunist Europe, I propose an alternative way to explain TJ demand. My approach focuses on the subjective perceptions that citizens have about what they think lustration procedures will generate.

To demonstrate the intuition behind my proposal, consider the following procedure to vet public officials who might have collaborated with the ancien régime. Imagine a community in which roughly 10 percent of the population collaborated with the former authoritarian regime; the remaining 90 percent was innocent. Suppose this community adopts a lustration procedure that correctly identifies 95 percent of actual collaborators. But the procedure also incorrectly classifies 10 percent of the innocent part of the population as collaborators, even
though they did not collaborate. This lustration procedure generates (1) a false acquittal rate of 5 percent (i.e., 5 percent of those who are guilty of collaboration are exonerated from responsibility) and (2) a false conviction rate of 10 percent (i.e., 10 percent of those who are innocent are erroneously classified as collaborators). If this lustration procedure is applied to candidates running for office, voters in this hypothetical community must resolve

1. What is the probability that a candidate is actually guilty of collaboration, given that he has been classified as a collaborator by the lustration procedure?
2. What is the probability that a candidate is actually guilty of collaboration even if the lustration procedure has cleared her of any misconduct?

A straightforward application of Bayes’s rule offers an objective answer to these voters’ dilemma. Given the overall rate of collaboration with the regime and the rates of false acquittals and false convictions, the answer to the first question is a little under 57 percent, and the answer to the second question is just slightly less than 1 percent.³ One voter in this community may consider a 57 percent probability to be quite high, but another may deem it to be very low.
Similarly, some voters may interpret a 99 percent assurance that candidates cleared of any collaboration are actually innocent to be more than adequate; yet, others may focus on the 1 percent false acquittal rate and want greater certainty. Put differently, some voters see the glass as half full, but others see it as half empty.

If the assumptions are correct, the Bayes’s rule generates objective probability measures. But how citizens perceive false acquittals as compared to false convictions is deeply personal and subjective. It is therefore not remarkable that the subjective lens through which voters evaluate the magnitude of false acquittals, on one hand, and false convictions on the other, affects their attitudes toward lustration (and TJ more generally).4

In this article, I investigate the factors that influence attitudes toward lustration in postcommunist Europe. Conventional wisdom posits that demand for lustration is determined by citizens’ pretransition experiences with the secret police or because of the frustration that many felt with the lack of TJ after those countries transitioned to democracy. My research suggests that how people perceive the fairness and outcome of the lustration process itself, while it is ongoing, has an independent and significant effect on their demand for lustration. Specifically, I show that demand for lustration is also shaped by the observed trade-off between letting collaborators go free (false acquittal) and allowing innocent people to be convicted of collaboration (false conviction).5 Every TJ mechanism involves the choice underlying Blackstone’s famous formulation that it “is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer” (William Blackstone, Commentaries 4). Not all voters would agree with Blackstone. This article shows that the citizens who are more sensitive to errors of false acquittal than to errors of false conviction are more likely to demand lustration than those who—like Blackstone—are more sensitive to falsely convicting an innocent person than to erroneously acquitting someone who is guilty.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The following section reviews the literature on attitudes toward outcomes of judicial procedures, subjective evaluations of fairness, and TJ. Next, I develop a theory of how the trade-off between errors of false acquittal and false conviction influences attitudes toward lustration. I then use original survey data that I collected in postcommunist Europe to test this theory against competing alternative explanations. I establish that there is a significant relationship between how citizens perceive the lustration process and their demand for lustration. In the Discussion section, I notice, however, that it is possible for these perceptions to be a reaction to the lustration process itself. Instead of contesting the possibility of endogeneity, I develop it as the main contribution of the article: subjective perceptions of the ongoing lustration process shape whether individuals prefer that it continues or ceases. Finally, I conclude by discussing how perceptions of lustration’s fairness have impacted the role that lustration policies have played more generally in democratic consolidation.

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Theories of Subjective Perceptions of the Judicial Processes

Those who research American Politics and write on the relationship between judicial decisions and public opinion find that American voters are more likely to both notice and reward judges for overpunishment than for underpunishment. Huber and Gordon (2004), for example, find that judges are aware of this tendency and become more punitive as they prepare to stand for reelection. They have also suggested ways in which the media’s whistle-blowing may be responsible for the public’s focus on underpunishment. But Gordon and Huber’s (2002) explanation begs the question why the public is affected differently when a defendant is punished too severely than when he is not sanctioned harshly enough.

Social psychologists investigating these kinds of questions as part of regulatory focus theory distinguish between promotion-focused (desires for advancement) and prevention-focused (need for security) motivations (Higgins and Molden 2003; Molden and Higgins 2004, 2005). Molden, Lee, and Higgins (2008) observed that promotion- versus prevention-oriented motivations affect how individuals form judgments. Gains (or promotion)-oriented individuals strive to avoid errors of omission and tend to “set lower thresholds for accepting potentially relevant information” (Molden, Lee, and Higgins 2008, 177). This behavior is contrasted with loss (prevention)-oriented individuals who try to avoid errors of commission. They set their thresholds for admitting information so high that they accept only what seems to be almost certain.

This work in social psychology suggests that people react to outcomes of criminal procedures based on how sensitive they are to false acquittals and false convictions; this sensitivity may depend, in turn, on promotion- versus prevention-focused motivations. In political science, outside the American Politics literature, few if any theoretical insights have been offered into how perceptions of fairness shape public demand for justice.

Exploring the links between how citizens subjectively perceive the lustration process and their attitudes toward lustration presents a fruitful contribution to a growing literature on the determinants of TJ and the reconciliation dynamics that exist in postconflict societies. This literature falls roughly into two categories originally distinguished by David Backer (2003). In the first, scholars have been exploring the so-called supply-side of TJ. They have focused on what politicians stand to gain or lose by adopting specific TJ mechanisms (Elster 2004; Huyse 1995, 1986; Stan 2009; Appel 2005). These scholars have generally argued that TJ procedures result directly from elite bargaining; in their view, the victims of authoritarian abuse, even though they bear the burden of poorly-designed institutions or enjoy the fruits of well-designed ones, have little influence on how TJ mechanisms are shaped. Some have argued that minimal TJ mechanisms (such as amnesty) can enable transitions to democracy in a way that procedures effecting strong accountability cannot (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
The second category of TJ research, the “demand-side” literature, studies whether TJ mechanisms respond to the demands of citizens in postconflict states. For instance, it explores whether truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) indeed help victims achieve reconciliation with their past or with their former oppressors. This readiness to reconcile with the past is often identified with a decrease in demand for TJ. James Gibson’s research on South Africa is illustrative. He shows that Blacks do not find that the TRC adequately provided retributive justice. He also illustrates, however, that if a victim’s sense of justice had been undermined by giving amnesty to his or her perpetrator, other TJ mechanisms—such as reparations, apologies, and especially giving victims an opportunity to describe what had happened to them—could have a restorative effect (Gibson 2002, 2004b). Although Gibson examines how ethnicity determines South Africans’ attitudes toward different TJ mechanisms, he does not explore how their perceptions of the fairness of the TRC process affect their attitudes toward TJ. David Backer (2006) researches the same dependent variable as Gibson but studies how each individual victim’s history of abuse affects that victim’s TJ attitude. Backer has found that TJ mechanisms that fall shy of punitive sanctions are less successful at reintegrating victims and reconciling them with the past. Backer’s analysis is more nuanced than Gibson’s because Backer controls for victims’ patterns of suffering as a determinant of their TJ attitudes. But Backer’s analysis still falls short of accounting for the demand for TJ that victims exhibited before the TRC was established, nor does he account for how they subjectively perceive the TJ mechanism’s fairness. The only research I have located that acknowledges subjective responses to the TJ process is Keren Brounèus’s (2010) article on the effects of serving as witnesses in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts. Brounèus’s research, however, is devoted to subjective responses to truth-telling rather than to mistakes in the adjudicatory process. None of the remaining demand-side literature (Choi and David 2006; Stover and Weinstein 2004; Backer 2003, 2004; Wiedelhaus-Brahm 2010; Samil 2010) accounts for the fact that citizens in postauthoritarian societies are sensitive to different types of errors in the TJ process and that the way they perceive a specific mechanism—with its mistakes and resulting procedural unfairness—may shape their demand for TJ.

In sum, although the supply-side TJ literature has studied TJ institutions as the product of elite bargaining, the demand-side research has, for the most part, explored it as a response to popular grievances that originated in the pretransition history. Neither of the two scholarly traditions account for the role of citizens’ perception of the TJ process while it is ongoing. This article fills this void by focusing on citizens’ tolerance of mistakes in the lustration process.

A Theory of Trade-Offs between False Conviction and False Acquittal Errors

The fairness of TJ processes is jeopardized by the fact that TJ mechanisms have to perform in far from ideal circumstances. Any scholarship examining the relevance
of fairness for the performance of TJ procedures must account for the problem of unreliable evidence. Evidence may be unreliable for at least two reasons:

1. some evidence of the ancien régime’s abusive activity was destroyed;\(^8\) and
2. some of the evidence of collaboration with this abusive regime was actually fabricated.\(^9\)

Using incomplete evidence in the TJ process is unfair because it reaches only those perpetrators whose collaboration is documented, leaving remaining collaborators unaffected. This error—false acquittal—is similar to Type II errors in statistics: the failure to accept a true alternative hypothesis.

The other form of unreliability—fabricated evidence that survives the transition—may result in accusing innocent persons. This kind of injustice—failure to protect the innocent or false conviction—corresponds to Type I errors: accepting a false alternative hypothesis. Furthermore, just as in the theory of statistical inference, the execution of TJ is marked by the trade-off between avoiding errors of false acquittal and false conviction. The more one wishes to avoid false acquittal, the easier it is to commit false conviction errors and vice versa. This is particularly evident in the case of lustration. On one hand, lustration procedures requiring little evidence of collaboration in order to classify someone as a collaborator can deal with vast destruction of secret police files without running the risk of extensive false acquittals. However, they increase the probability of falsely convicting those who are innocent of collaboration: although few perpetrators will be in the situation of having all evidence of past collaboration destroyed, some victims of fabricated evidence may be targeted.

On the other hand, lustration laws requiring considerable evidence before classifying someone as a collaborator can deal with evidence falsification, as it is hard to have so much evidence falsified to meet the high threshold of a mild lustration law. Hence, they reduce the chances of false conviction. But they are likely to result in false acquittal errors: for some former collaborators, so much evidence could have been destroyed that what is left is insufficient to make them face responsibility.

Simply put, stringent laws are less likely to lead to errors of false acquittal, but more likely to result in errors of false conviction. In contrast, mild lustration laws—laws that require considerable evidence to be presented before a target is named a collaborator—will result in fewer errors of false conviction at the price of more frequent false acquittal.

The hypothetical lustration procedure from the introduction showed why individual citizens, when confronted with outcomes of TJ procedures, might resolve this trade-off differently. Consequently, their demand for lustration may be shaped by how sensitive they are to avoiding one type of error rather than the other. Intuitively, where an individual places on the spectrum of sensitivity to false acquittal versus false conviction will shape his or her attitude to whether lustration should continue or stop. I expect sensitivity to false acquittal would steer citizens’ demand to
stringent lustration because stringent lustration laws reduce such errors, even though this comes at the cost of false conviction. This leads to our first main hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** Higher sensitivity to false acquittal errors leads to higher demand for lustration.

But as noted earlier, mild lustration laws by requiring considerable evidence of collaboration before issuing sanctions reduce chances of committing false conviction errors. They do this, however, at the cost of increasing the chances of false acquittal. Thus, a priori, one would expect that perceiving errors of false conviction will lead respondents to demand less stringent lustration procedures because these procedures, make the occurrence of false conviction less likely. Therefore, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** Higher sensitivity to false conviction leads to a lower demand for lustration.

Given the tension between reducing false acquittal and false conviction, individuals give priority to avoiding one of the errors at the cost of increasing the occurrence of the other. I hypothesize that the tendency to focus on one error rather than the other shapes individual demand for lustration. Taken together, Hypotheses 1 and 2 represent how perceptions of procedural fairness shape demand for lustration. The next section considers other alternative determinants of this demand.

**Pretransition Experiences with Authoritarian Repression**

As noted earlier, prevailing TJ scholarship has attributed the demand for TJ to the pretransition experience that citizens have with authoritarianism. The available survey data, though, enables us to test the impact that the severity and timing of human rights violations have on individuals’ preferences for TJ. Thus far, scholars have examined such hypotheses with data from no more than one country. For instance, Gibson (2004a, 211) found that those who benefited from the apartheid were more likely to be reconciled with the past than South Africans of other races. He also found that Blacks who suffered losses under the apartheid were more likely to accept the TRC’s critique of the ancien régime than were members of other races. But Gibson found the opposite to be true for Colored people, and he did not find that past experiences had any effect on Whites. In contrast, David Backer (2006) determined that the attitudes that victims have toward the truth and reconciliation process are systematically different from those of the general public. While the latter are ambivalent about whether the TRC played an important role in the reconciliation process, an overwhelming majority of victims saw the TRC’s role as vital.
Although falling victim to the apartheid regime is certainly a different type of victimization than being spied upon by secret police informers, lustration and the TRC, respectively, are Eastern Europe’s and South Africa’s prevalent nonpunitive TJ procedures. Hence, if pretransition experiences with authoritarian repression shape demand for lustration, former dissidents should have a higher demand for lustration than the general public. Our first alternative hypothesis of demand for TJ can be stated as

**Hypothesis 3:** Citizens who were involved in anticommunist resistance have a higher demand for lustration than citizens who were not involved in such resistance.

**Threat Perceptions**

The second explanation in the current literature focuses on emotional reactions after the transition in response to past grievances. To start, note that support for lustration can be interpreted as political intolerance. Political psychologists consider perceived threat as the “single best group-level predictor of exclusionism and intolerance” (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). According to Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009), in politics, individuals who perceive an out-group as a threat adopt hostile attitudes toward that group’s members and try to deprive them of political power. Canneti-Nisim et al. conclude that, particularly in democratic systems where citizens can influence public policy, “such individual tendencies may lead to the initiation of collective exclusionist policies” (p. 366).

Research on political tolerance in South Africa shows that those individuals who perceive their political enemies as threats are less likely to tolerate their presence in political life (Gibson 2004b, 227; Gibson and Gouws 1999). Logically, citizens who feel threatened by former communists should demand lustration more than individuals who do not feel threatened by former communists. Our next alternative hypothesis explaining TJ demand is

**Hypothesis 4:** Citizens who feel threatened by the presence of former communists have a higher demand for lustration than citizens who do not feel threatened by them in this way.

**Framing**

The final alternative explanation for TJ demand I consider begins with the premise that demand for lustration has little to do with past grievances. Indeed, suppose that citizens are not strongly predisposed to having an opinion about whether or not lustration should be implemented. How would citizens develop attitudes to lustration in this situation?

The framing literature in American Politics offers one plausible answer. It theorizes that citizens’ preferences are endogenous to how politicians frame their
agenda on issues with low salience or high levels of complexity (such as Supreme Court decisions). When prompted to form an opinion on a challenging issue, voters find it easier to adopt the preferences of politicians for whom they voted (Iyengar and Simon 1993). A framing mechanism could account for how preferences for TJ formed in postcommunist Europe, where the most severe acts of communist repression had occurred more than thirty years ago and democratic transitions arose through peaceful bargaining. Consequently, under an alternative hypothesis based on framing, a typical voter has few reasons to hold a grudge against former autocrats and may adopt his or her elected official’s preferences toward lustration. The hypothesis based on framing as the alternative explanation can be stated as

**Hypothesis 5**: Citizens who vote for parties that advocate the need for lustration have higher demand for lustration than citizens who vote for parties that are skeptical about such policies.

Far from being an exhaustive set of alternative explanations for TJ demand, Hypotheses 3 through 5 offer a selection of most widely held hypotheses that can be tested with data disaggregated to the individual level. Although the data are unique, because they come from the same transitional justice survey carried out in three countries, it cannot be used to test hypotheses in which the unit of analysis is the state.

In the next section, I examine whether errors of false conviction and false acquittal affect citizens’ demand for TJ, even after controlling for citizens’ involvement in anticommunist resistance, their voting behavior, and the extent to which they find communists threatening.

**Method**

I designed and executed a survey on representative national samples in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic specifically for this project. These three countries were subject to Communist rule for almost half a century, and all three transitioned to democracy in 1989. Their citizens perceived Communist rule as forcefully imposed and maintained by the Soviets, although perhaps to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia than in Poland or Hungary. They also shared common experiences recovering from state socialist economies (although Czechoslovakia inherited less foreign debt than Poland and Hungary did). Since their 1989 transitions, Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians viewed joining the European Union as a top priority, which all three countries accomplished simultaneously in 2004.

My data come from 3,057 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2004–2005 in the respondents’ homes. The online appendix describes the survey instrument in detail. In the following, I describe how I operationalized the dependent and independent variables from Hypotheses 1 through 5. The online appendix is available at [http://www.nd.edu/~mnaelepa/index_files/ToleratingMistakesAppendix.htm](http://www.nd.edu/~mnaelepa/index_files/ToleratingMistakesAppendix.htm)
Operationalization

I measured the dependent variable—Demand for TJ—with the survey question “Do you agree that at this point in time, lustration should be carried out, that is links of politicians to the secret police should be examined?” Respondents could Agree Strongly (5), Agree (4), be Uncertain (3), Disagree (2), or Disagree Strongly (1). The responses to the question are summarized in Figure 1 from the introduction. The highest demand for lustration operationalized by this question is exhibited in Poland where 57.4 percent of the respondents agreed or agreed strongly. The lowest demand is in Hungary (only 39.7 percent of respondents fall into the agree and agree strongly categories).

Two aspects of the question that was posed to the respondents are critical. First, lustration is defined as “examining links to the secret police.” And second, the question asked respondents to provide their answers as of “this point in time,” when they answered the survey.

Defining lustration to mean “examining links to the secret police” ensured that the respondents understood lustration to mean uncovering clandestine collaboration—not “decommunization” under which former communists are banned from office. Although related, the two forms of TJ tap into different attitudes.

I measured how respondents perceived false conviction errors by asking respondents to Agree Strongly (5), Agree (4), be Uncertain (3), Disagree (2), or Disagree Strongly (1) with the statement “The problem with lustration is that files of the former secret police are not reliable and using them may result in accusing innocent people.” Conversely, to operationalize perceptions toward false acquittal errors, I asked respondents about the extent to which they agreed that the “problem with lustration is that files of the secret police were destroyed, so that many collaborators will not be uncovered anyway.” I used the same 5-point scale.

To operationalize pretransition experiences with authoritarian repression, I asked respondents to identify the number of people they knew who had been spied on by the secret political police. The answer to this question serves as a proxy for resistance to the communist regime because those respondents who have stronger ties to the former opposition (such as dissident leaders) are assumed to know more victims of spying. Asking questions about ties to a network allows us to gauge actual affiliations. Asking directly whether the respondent was “a supporter or resister of the former authoritarian regime” was unlikely to generate sincere answers because, in states where the autocrats were unpopular, respondents were likely to misrepresent their pretransition sympathies. So, in Poland, for example, the responses would have been skewed toward participation in the opposition.

To assess perceptions of communist threat, I asked “How threatening to Poland’s (Hungary’s/Czech Republic’s) way of life do you believe communists are?” I offered respondents five possible responses Extremely threatening (5), Somewhat threatening (4), Uncertain (3), Not particularly threatening (2), and Not at all threatening (1).
To operationalize past voting behavior for the framing hypothesis, I asked, “Which party did you vote for in the most recent parliamentary elections?” and coded responses with measures from the Party Policy in Modern Democracies (PPMD) expert survey conducted by Benoit and Laver (2007). In postcommunist Europe, the PPMD questionnaire asked experts to locate parties’ positions on a 20-point thermometer scale, where 1 represented Former communist party officials should have the same rights and opportunities as other citizens to participate in public life and 20 represented Former communist party officials should be kept out of public life as far as possible.

In addition, all statistical models include controls for basic demographics, such as age, sex, education, and dwelling (urban vs. rural). Table A1 in the online appendix provides summary statistics for all of the main variables, by country.

**Model**

I modeled the ordinal dependent variable as a vector of coordinates representing the probabilities of falling into each of the five categories. Conducting an ordinary least squares regression would not adequately predict probability, so I instead used maximum likelihood estimation with a logit link function. I split the full sample into three country subsamples, with $n = 1,005, 1,003$, and $1,049$ in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, respectively. Although the approach of splitting samples may strike some as inefficient, here, the sample size is sufficiently large to surmount efficiency concerns. Most importantly, by splitting the sample, I avoided constraining the cut points in the ordinal logit model to be identical across the subsamples. This is represented by indexing the cut points, not only by category ($k$) but also by country ($j$).

**Results**

The results of the estimation are shown in Table 1. To present comparable results across country samples, I report the marginal effects for variables that are significant at the .05 level. Alternatively, the substantive effects may also be conveniently represented by reporting changes in predicted probabilities of falling into different categories of TJ demand following a standard deviation change in each variable of interest. This is done while holding the other variables at their means. In Table A3, in the online appendix, I do this separately for each country subsample and for each substantive TJ demand category: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, and Agree Strongly. The table also provides 95 percent confidence intervals. To illustrate the effects more clearly, I provide the cumulative effect of a standard deviation change in the variable of interest on the changes in probability of falling into the Agree and Agree Strongly categories and report these in Figure 2’s cumulative effects on high TJ demand. Similarly, I aggregate the changes in predicted probabilities of falling into the Strongly Disagree and Disagree categories and report them as cumulative effects on low TJ demand in Figure 3.
These results show that the extent to which citizens focus on the possibility of false acquittals versus false convictions of a lustration process shapes their preferences for whether lustration should continue or cease. These perceptions of false acquittals versus false convictions significantly predict demand for lustration after controlling for a person’s perceived threat from former autocrats, a person’s voting behavior, and even a person’s prior involvement in resisting the ancien régime.

Table 1. Ordinal Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects (Dependent Variable: TJ Demand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>False Acquittal</td>
<td>.205 (.09)*</td>
<td>.653 (.1)*</td>
<td>.372 (.0754)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False Conviction/C0</td>
<td>−.464 (.086)*</td>
<td>−.29 (.092)*</td>
<td>−.303 (.084)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Vote</td>
<td>.378 (.078)*</td>
<td>.48 (.082)*</td>
<td>.456 (.079)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist threat/C0</td>
<td>.567 (.057)*</td>
<td>.259 (.061)*</td>
<td>.153 (.063)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to opposition/C0</td>
<td>.351 (.104)*</td>
<td>.1505 (.113)</td>
<td>.191 (.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to regime/C0</td>
<td>.177 (.132)</td>
<td>.0516 (.167)</td>
<td>−.13 (.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement/C0</td>
<td>.261 (.171)</td>
<td>−.169 (.137)</td>
<td>.015 (.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/C0</td>
<td>.004 (.005)</td>
<td>−.005 (.004)</td>
<td>.000 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/C0</td>
<td>−.004 (.08)</td>
<td>−.119 (.072)</td>
<td>−.009 (.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex/C0</td>
<td>−.2 (.125)</td>
<td>−.201 (.133)</td>
<td>−.1 (.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fascist threat/C0</td>
<td>.053 (.062)</td>
<td>.011 (.057)</td>
<td>.0321 (.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 1</td>
<td>.53 (.63)</td>
<td>.144 (.72)</td>
<td>2.139 (.775)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 2</td>
<td>1.79 (.62)</td>
<td>2.58 (.74)</td>
<td>2.888 (.776)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 3</td>
<td>3.49 (.63)</td>
<td>3.86 (.75)</td>
<td>3.887 (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 4</td>
<td>5.17 (.64)</td>
<td>5.196 (.77)</td>
<td>4.911 (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKelvey-Zavoina $R^2$</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marginal Effects of Variables Significant at the .05 level.

Figure 2. Cumulative effect of standard deviation change in variable of interest on TJ high demand
In the Czech Republic, a standard deviation increase in false conviction errors decreases by almost 10 percent the probability of falling into the high TJ demand categories. But the same change in false acquittal errors increases the probability of falling into a category of high TJ demand by less than five percentage points. In contrast, the effect of false acquittal errors is smaller (less than five percentage points) than any other significant variable.

In Poland, on the other hand, a standard deviation increase in false acquittal errors leads to an 8 percent increase in the probability of falling into one of the high TJ demand categories. It also leads to an almost 5 percent decrease in the chance of falling into one of the low TJ demand categories. This makes false acquittal one of the strongest predictors of TJ demand among all of the significant variables in the model. At the same time, false conviction has the weakest effect of all: a standard deviation increase leads to a less than 2 percent increase in the probability of falling into either of the low TJ demand categories.

In Hungary, false acquittal and false conviction rank as second and third, respectively, in their effects on the probability of falling into TJ demand categories, but both are outranked by past voting behavior. A standard deviation increase in voting for parties that put TJ on their agenda decreases by 11 percentage points the probability of falling into a low TJ demand categories and increases by 13 percent the probability of falling into a high TJ demand category.

**Discussion**

These results connect perceptions of false acquittal with high demand for lustration, on one hand, and show a connection between perceptions of false conviction and low demand for lustration, on the other. This is consistent with the trade-off between avoiding false acquittal and false conviction that individuals consider when evaluating how fair TJ mechanisms are. If TJ procedures require a substantial amount of
evidence before someone can be accused of collaboration, false conviction errors are less likely. But in that case, errors of false acquittal increase because insufficient evidence may exist to charge those who are guilty of collaboration to satisfy the evidentiary threshold. (This could happen because much evidence was destroyed.)

In contrast, if the TJ procedure requires little evidence before an accusation can be lodged, false acquittal errors become less frequent, but the chances of false convictions increase—because enough evidence could have been fabricated to support (erroneous) accusations.

The finding also departs from the way that the existing literature has attempted to explain individual demand for TJ—namely, by focusing either on the experiences of authoritarian repression or by how threatened individuals felt in the transition’s aftermath. Neither explanation attributes the demand for TJ to the transitional justice process itself, which is ongoing. The analysis presented here offers a novel approach: the independent variables explaining demand for lustration are not actual false convictions or false acquittals but the perception of whether the lustration process generates those outcomes. These findings corroborate the premise that for some, the lustration process itself feeds exaggerated perceptions about false convictions yet, simultaneously, about false acquittals for others.

Obviously, inflating the impact of false acquittals is easier in countries where lustration laws are mild in the first place. Conversely, it also requires less effort to focus on false convictions if the lustration law in force is extremely stringent. This helps account for the differences among the countries, as reported earlier. For at least the five years preceding the survey, all three countries had been carrying out lustration programs at different times and with varied levels of severity. The Czech Republic embarked on the earliest and the most severe program. Anyone who maintained a public position was required to petition the Ministry of Interior for a lustration certificate—even if the position was as minor as that of a post office manager. Failing to document one’s innocence with a lustration certificate led to automatic disqualification. That lustration program affected almost 5 percent of the Czech Republic’s citizens. In Poland, by contrast, the target of lustration could keep her office even if she collaborated, so long as she disclosed all facts relevant to her collaboration. Poland’s procedure was not only milder than the Czech Republic’s, but it was not implemented until the late 1990s, many years after transition. The lustration law in Hungary was delayed (as in Poland) and initially reached only six hundred national government officials. Similarly to Poland, proven collaborators in Hungary were not banned from holding office, but the compromising facts about their past were disclosed to their electorate.

As a result, much of the difference between the Czech Republic and Poland/Hungary in Figures 2 and 3 can be attributed to the differences in the characteristics and timing of the lustration laws in those countries. The law was quite simply much tougher in the Czech Republic than in the other two countries. It stands to reason that Czechs would worry more about false convictions than Poles and Hungarians, who would conversely have greater sensitivity to false acquittals than do Czechs.
Consequently, although there is no reason why perceptions of procedural fairness should directly reflect the reality of lustration, opponents of lustration could seize on procedural problems (such as false convictions) to rationalize why they oppose TJ instead of admitting that they worry about its actual repercussions. Likewise, those who support lustration could hide behind procedural concerns by citing apprehensions over false acquittals instead of admitting that they actually want revenge. In this case, we would certainly observe a correlation between support for lustration and how fair the process is perceived to be.

To be sure, the demand that individuals have for lustration in postcommunist Europe is endogenous to lustration itself. While the process is ongoing, some individuals react to it by forming beliefs about its fairness and demand that it continue or end. But it does not necessarily follow that other factors have no bearing on attitudes to lustration. In particular, Figure 3 shows that perceptions of communist threat are a significant covariate in predicting demand for lustration. For instance, in the Czech Republic, threat perception impacts the change in probability of falling into low and high TJ demand categories by 9 and 14 percentage points, respectively. Outside the Czech Republic, though, the effect of threat perceptions is considerably lower. In Hungary, both impacts are less than 4 percent.24

**Threat Perceptions**

Given the prominent place that threat perceptions have in the political tolerance literature (Gibson and Gouws 1999), why threat perceptions might influence demand for lustration in Czechoslovakia but not in Poland and Hungary merits at least some consideration.

Since the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, communism had a stronger following in Czechoslovakia25 than it did in Poland or Hungary. The communist party was electorally strong in the 1920s and 1930s (it was the second-strongest performer in 1925 and came fourth in the 1935 elections), particularly in Bohemia and Moravia. And although in the 1940s communists won a plurality in the first free and fair elections of the post–World War II period, in 1948, they grabbed power in a coup d’etat. Building on their mass support, within a year of the coup, they proceeded to permeate Czechoslovakian communities with party organizations establishing a party cell “for every 286 Czechs and every 400 Slovaks” (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 23). In contrast, the communist parties in Poland and Hungary were perceived as externally imposed by the Soviet Union (Bunce 1999). Moreover, the Czech communist party relied for support on its blue-collar base. Labor constituted 90 percent of party membership, as opposed to Poland and Hungary, where it accounted for less than 30 percent of the membership. According to Anna Grzymala-Busse (2002), this allowed the Czech communists to pursue an ideologically selective recruitment strategy (closed elite advancement), as opposed to the technocratic recruitment approach that the Hungarian and Polish communists adopted. Thanks to its ideological rigidity—and reinforced by the crackdown on the 1968 Prague Spring—the communist
government keenly avoided accommodating elites who refused to join its party ranks. The Czech communist elites resisted roundtable negotiations and saw their authoritarian regime collapse under the fervor of the 1989 anticommunist revolutions that swept through Europe. The Polish and Hungarian communists, on the other hand, negotiated their way out of power and “survived democracy” (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 20). The Czech communists did not appreciate the magnitude of regime change they faced. Indeed, they were also among the few parties in Eastern Europe that failed to reform into social–democratic parties to compete in elections following the democratic transition. Grzymala-Busse (2002) contrasts this failure with the swift and extensive way in which the Polish and Hungarian communists reformed their party organizations to win pluralities in democratic elections. Hungarian and Polish party members even completely severed themselves from communist ideology.

The substantial difference in how communist rule was established and maintained between Czechoslovakia on one hand, and Poland and Hungary on the other, suggests that perceptions of communist threats survived the transition in Czechoslovakia. Those threat perceptions were powerful enough to increase demand for lustration in Czechoslovakia but not in Hungary and Poland. The same phenomenon also manifests itself in the way that anticommunist dissidence significantly predicts TJ demand in Czechoslovakia.

**Pretransition Experiences with Authoritarian Repression**

The low support for the hypothesized effect of past experiences with authoritarian repression also calls for an explanation. The sign on the coefficient is consistent with Hypothesis 3. A standard deviation increase in a respondent’s ties to the pretransition opposition increases by more than 5 percentage points the probability the respondent falls into a high TJ demand category. It also decreases by nearly 3 percentage points the probability that he falls into one of the low TJ demand categories. But there is no parallel effect in Poland and Hungary. This makes sense. The cost of participating in dissident activity in Czechoslovakia was high, particularly after the violent suppression of Prague Spring. Any Czechoslovakian who refused to join the Communist Party or one of its youth organizations risked forgoing her ability to obtain a high school degree or having a white-collar career. Regardless of education or qualification, a dissident who went to prison would be relegated upon release to work as a janitor or welder or in another job of diminished status.

The last significant covariate is past voting behavior. In line with Hypothesis 5, voters casting their ballots on parties with pro-lustration agendas exhibit a higher probability of falling into the high TJ demand categories and a lower probability of falling into the low TJ demand categories than do voters who support parties with anti-lustration agendas.
Conclusion

The data analyzed here reveal that demand for lustration in postcommunist Europe has little to do with past grievances directed at former communist autocrats or with experiences that precede the democratic transition. Instead, the attitudes that citizens have toward lustration depend on whether they perceive the ongoing lustration process as fair. How harshly an individual wants to hold former autocrats accountable depends on where that individual falls on a sensitivity scale that ranges between (a) an acute sensitivity to false acquittals and (b) a strong awareness that someone who is actually innocent can be falsely convicted. After controlling for alternative explanations advanced in the literature, the results here demonstrate that concerns with procedural fairness—that is, with respect to false acquittal or false conviction errors—are powerful determinants of demand for TJ. When citizens perceive errors of false conviction, they demand less lustration than when they perceive errors of false acquittal. This holds true even though the relative impact of false conviction and false acquittal varies among the countries in the data set. In Poland, perceptions of false acquittal dominate perceptions of false conviction as a predictor of TJ demand, but for Czechs, avoiding false conviction is much more important than is avoiding false acquittal. Perceptions of false acquittal have a higher impact on TJ demand in Hungary and in Poland than in the Czech Republic. Perceptions of false conviction have a lower impact on transitional demand in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, yet a higher impact than in Poland.

Threat perceptions of former communists remain significant in predicting changes of TJ demand in the Czech Republic, but in Poland, this effect is eclipsed by the perceptions of false acquittal errors and, in Hungary, by perceptions of both false acquittal and false conviction.

These findings may be interpreted, optimistically, as signaling an effective reconciliation process in which emotional reactions such as perceived threats are slowly giving way to more rational, albeit still subjective, considerations of procedural fairness. But the alternative, strategic conclusion is less rosy. Note that how judicial process actually functions and how the masses perceive it are very different. Theoretically, having many actual false convictions and false acquittals may not necessarily cause an increase in the perceived false acquittal and conviction rates. This is because what drives perceptions may depend on how the TJ process is characterized and on how the political elites discuss it. Politicians eager to make lustration harsher will exaggerate the implications of tolerating former communists and their collaborators in state administration. Politicians seeking to weaken or strike down lustration laws will amplify the occurrence of false convictions. This interpretation fits squarely with the finding here that voting behavior predicts lustration, which confirms the framing hypothesis. It is also consistent with the expanding research on strategic uses and misuses of transitional justice (Stan 2009; Loyle 2010).

The point about strategic uses of lustration is a subtle one but helps reconcile two sides of the TJ debate between scholars of democratic consolidation. One side of this
argument—from the literature on political tolerance (Gibson 2004; Gibson and Gouws 1999) suggests that citizens who feel threatened by former communists should demand lustration more than individuals who do not feel threatened in this way. On the other side of this debate, students of democratic consolidation have argued that fear of authoritarian backlash prevents new democratic leaders from engaging in TJ (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond and Plattner 2001). However, if citizens’ preferences are framed by political leaders, then citizens whose threat perceptions would have led them to demand lustration may be swayed to resist it by political elites fearing authoritarian backlash. Our empirical results lend support to both sides of the arguments made by democratization scholars.

The strategic interpretation is particularly plausible in the context of postcommunist Europe, where lustration has become the dominant form of transitional justice. Truth commissions are virtually nonexistent, trials of former communist autocrats have been few and far between, and attempts to effect property restitution have been put on hold out of fear of bankrupting the new states. At the same time, lustration, which can damage a politician’s reputation and thereby elevate the popularity of another, remains the TJ procedure most susceptible to political manipulation.

Finally, these findings also lead to a policy implication—and (perhaps) a reason for optimism. Earlier, I described the trade-off between avoiding false acquittal and false conviction that those who design TJ mechanisms confront. The more evidence that is required to accuse someone of collaboration, the lower the chance of a false conviction error but the greater the likelihood of a false acquittal. Designers of TJ systems must err in one direction or the other. The findings of this research suggest that if TJ institutions were implemented to meet the citizen demand, they need not be structured based on any society’s history of authoritarian oppression or by residual sentiments about authoritarian threat. Instead, they should be designed so as to maximize their citizens’ perceptions of fairness. Maintaining focus on those perceptions would not only align the policy with the demand for it, but it would also be forward-looking rather than anchored in a static past.

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Notes

1. Although only postcommunist states refer to their vetting procedures as ‘‘lustration,’’ the practice of banning from prominent public positions members and collaborators of former oppressive regimes extends beyond Eastern Europe. Deba’thification in Iraq and denazification following WWII are important examples of lustration-like procedures.

2. There is variation across the three countries in the timing of the anticommunist protests, subsequent communist crackdowns, as well as the extent of repercussions inflicted by the communist state upon those expressing their grievances toward it (Ekiert 1996). The most severe anticommunist crackdown took place in Hungary in 1956. It was also the earliest. The least deadly was also the most recent and occurred in Poland in 1981.

3. If \( P(C) \) is the percentage of collaborators in society, \( P(L|I) \) is the probability of being identified as a collaborator if one is innocent, and \( P(L|C) \) is the probability of being identified as a collaborator by the lustration procedure if one indeed is a collaborator; the probabilities of interest are \( P(C|L) \)—the conditional probability of being guilty of collaboration, given a positive outcome of the lustration procedure and \( P(C \sim L) \) – be the probability of being a collaborator conditional on being cleared by the lustration procedure. Both numbers quoted in the main text are derived from Bayes’ rule. For instance, \( P(C|L) \) is calculated as 56.899 percent \( \quad = \frac{P(L|C) \times P(C)}{P(L|C) \times P(C) + P(L|I) \times P(I)} \). Similar calculations lead to \( P(C \sim L) = .6 \) percent.

4. Social and political psychologists have studied the relationship between subjective perceptions and group-level exclusionism. See, for instance, Quillian (1995) and Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982).

5. In using these terms, I refer to the findings from classical legal theory (Blackstone and Morrison 2001).

6. Researchers investigating the determinants of one type of motivation over the other have found that sensing possibilities of advancement over security, gains versus losses, or the possibility of being rejected versus ignored, activates promotion-focused rather prevention-focused motivations (Higgins et al. 1994; Evans and Petty 2003; Molden et al. 2009). Neuropsychologists have developed the research on circumstances under which one motivation rather than the other gets activated and found that gain-oriented motivations are associated with greater left hemisphere of the brain’s frontal cortex, whereas loss-oriented emotions are associated with greater right hemisphere activity (Amodio et al. 2004).

7. This strategy increases the chances of rejecting an incorrect hypothesis; those using it must believe that ‘‘it is better to fail to endorse a hypothesis that might be correct (and possibly miss being right) than to endorse the hypothesis (and risk being wrong)’’ (Molden, Lee, and Higgins 2008, 177).

8. Incentives for destroying evidence of human rights violations are common to all outgoing authoritarian regimes, but the destruction is relatively easy to carry out when the same
agency that produced the documents is up to the transition still responsible for their maintenance. This was the case in East Central Europe. Consider, for example, Poland, where the secret police began destroying their files seven years before the transition (Rzeczpospolita 2001). Following the transition, historians determined that of the 297 transcripts from the meetings of the Political Bureau created between 1982 and 1989, only 6 survived (Perzkowski 1994). They also discovered that the secret police prioritized destroying files documenting the infiltration of the Catholic Church and the Solidarity trade union. Yet, these orders were only partially executed and considerable evidence of infiltrating the church and Solidarity survived the transition. According to a posttransition secret service branch chief, destroying older files that had been sent back to the archives was more difficult than removing the more recent files. A similar pattern of destruction prevailed in Czechoslovakia, where files of informers who were active up until the transition were easiest to destroy (Interviews: CA2, CO6, CO3, and CA7 [note: “interviews” refers to interviews conducted by the author with elite politicians, archivists, and journalists; coding is as follows: the first letter of the code represents the country of the interviewed respondent: P = Poland, C = Czech Republic, H = Hungary; the second letter represents the affiliation: O = neutral, L = liberal, A = anticommunist, C = postcommunist]).

9. In communist Europe, secret police officers had incentives for fabricating evidence because they were compensated proportionately to the number of recruited informers. Secret police officers had to self-report failing to recruit an informer. Because repeat failures could delay promotion, prior to performance audits, the figures of newly registered informants would rise (Interview: PC2). Secret police officers would also use falsified evidence to exert pressure on dissidents to become turncoat collaborators. In Poland, some secret political police units had special departments of misinformation, which task was to fabricate evidence of collaboration for popular members of the opposition. This evidence would be delivered to other opposition activists in order to disintegrate the trust-based social network of the conspiring dissidents. In closed and conspired environments, the smallest suspicion of a dissident’s collaboration with the repressive regime led to his exclusion from the group (Staniland 2010, chap. 3).

10. Gibson and other scholars of South Africa have used term “Colored people” to describe non-Black, non-White, and non-South Asian minorities in that country.

11. In addition to political science research, social psychologists who conducted experiments on subliminal exposure to political symbols find that even the presence of nonconscious ideological symbols can significantly impact not only voting intentions but also actual voting (Hassin et al. 2007).

12. Hypotheses formulated at the state-level include, for example, (1) where citizens have faced widespread and gross human rights violations, the demand for TJ is higher than in places with fewer human rights violations (Huysse 1995; Rosenberg 1995); (2) demand for TJ is lower in places that experienced human rights violations long ago, than in places where human rights violations occurred more recently (Elster 2004); (3) the presence of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) exerting pressure on local governments to implement TJ mechanisms increases demand for TJ (Sikkink 2004); or (4) TJ
demand is weaker in democratizing states that have other pressing issues that they are forced to confront (Nino 1996).

13. I was aided by Pentor Survey Research Company in Poland, Hoffman Research International in Hungary, and Opinion Window Research International in the Czech Republic.

14. At the same time, while in Poland only 20 percent of the respondents fall into the disagree or disagree strongly categories, in Hungary, as many as 38.4 percent of the respondents fall into these low TJ demand categories.

15. A section comparing attitudes to lustration with attitudes to decommunization illustrating that they are distinct not only conceptually but also empirically is provided in the online appendix.

16. This operationalization draws on findings from informational networks scholarship (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991).

17. This is a typical measurement error resulting from asking sensitive questions or questions about facts with respect to which respondents have strong feelings of obligation (Oppenheim 1992). Scholars of political behavior have noticed that American voters tend to overreport turnout. They also have noted that this overreporting does not distort predictions of electoral outcomes on the basis of vote intentions (Cassel and Sigelman 2001). However, in the case of affiliations with the autocrats, a bias toward overreporting ties to the opposition would decrease standard errors and could potentially exaggerate the significance of these effects.

18. This question had the strongest correlation with political tolerance in Gibson’s (2004b) South African surveys from 1996 and 2001.

19. Given the nature of my dependent variable, the hypotheses from the theory section should be framed in terms of falling into TJ demand categories: (1) Hypothesis 1a: An increase in sensitivity to false acquittal errors increases the probability that citizens fall into high categories of demand for TJ. (2) Hypothesis 1b: An increase in sensitivity to false acquittal errors decreases the probability that citizens fall into low categories of demand for TJ. (3) Hypothesis 2a: An increase in sensitivity to false conviction errors increases the probability that citizens fall into low categories of demand for TJ. (4) Hypothesis 2b: An increase in sensitivity to false conviction errors decreases the probability that citizens fall into high categories of demand for TJ.

20. I ran various specifications of the model, including the remaining variables from the TJS survey and using country dummies instead of the split-sample strategy. The significant covariates reported here remained significant under all these specifications. I performed a Brant test to check for the parallel regression assumption. The test came out significant for one variable (importance of false acquittal) in one country (Poland). The results from, a generalized least squares model for that variable are .4713218 for the first cut point, .3991144 for the second, .7509962 for the third, and .7683351 for the fourth. The effects of the five covariates remained significant and similar to the estimates reported in Table 3.

21. In the original TJS survey, 10 percent (Poland and Czech Republic) to 16 percent (Hungary) of the observations had missing data. I used the Amelia software written by King et al. (2001) to correct for the missing values (available at: http://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml). For all tests and regressions, I used STATA 9.
22. In Table 1, marginal effects have been taken at the independent variables’ means.
23. The strength of this result is enhanced by the fact the sensitivity to false acquittal and sensitivity to false conviction are correlated positively with at .57.
24. In the Czech Republic, we observe the strongest correlation between threat perceptions with TJ demand: at 0.2853, it has the highest correlation with the dependent variable among all of the model’s independent variables. We would thus expect this variable to have a much stronger effect on the dependent variable.
25. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia took place in 1993. Hence, when I refer to events taking place in what is today the Czech Republic prior to this date, I use the term Czechoslovakia.
26. Notably, earlier research using data on the same three countries has rejected the alternative hypothesis that citizens’ preferences for transitional justice causes them to elect like-minded politicians (Nalepa 2010).

References


